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CHAPTER 4 
Domestic Relations 
SURVEY stafft 
§ 4.1. Removal of Minor Children from the Commonwealth by the Cus-
todial Parent.* Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, section 30 gov-
erns the removal of minor children from the Commonwealth by the 
custodial parent. The statute, in relevant part, provides that if the courts 
of this state have jurisdiction over the custody of a minor child of di-
vorced parents, the child shall not be removed from the state "without 
the consent of both parents, unless the court upon cause shown otherwise 
orders." 1 Courts have held that cause for removal absent parental consent 
exists only where removal is in the best interests of the child. 2 In 1981, 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the interests of the custodial 
parent should be taken into account in determining whether the best 
interests of the child would be served by his or her removal from the 
Commonwealth. 3 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Yannas v. 
t Jane A. Bell, Sarah Borstel Porter, Janet K. Adachi, Margaret B. Crockett, James C. 
Duda, Mark A. Katzoff, Michael E. Peeples. 
*Jane Bell, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.1. 1 G.L. c. 208, § 30 (1984) provides: 
/d. 
A minor child of divorced parents who is a native of or has resided five years within 
this commonwealth and over whose custody and maintenance the superior court or 
a probate court has jurisdiction shall not, if of suitable age to signify his consent, be 
removed out of this commonwealth without such consent, or, if under that age, 
without the consent of both parents, unless the court upon cause shown otherwise 
orders. The court, upon application of any person in behalf of such child, may 
require security and issue writs and processes to effect the purposes of this ... 
[section]. 
In the past, removal has commonly been denied "because of the potential loss of juris-
diction over custody issues." Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 51, 491 A.2d 606, 610 (1984). 
This concern has been met in large part by the adoption in 44 states of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act, and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A (1982). /d. at 51, 491 A.2d at 610-11. 
2 Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704,711,481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (1985); Rubin 
v. Rubin, 370 Mass. 857, 857, 346 N.E.2d 919, 920 (1976). 
3 Hale v. Hale, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 820, 429 N.E.2d 340, 345 (1981). For a good 
discussion of the Hale opinion, see Donna, Domestic Relations, 1981 ANN. SuRV. MASS. 
LAW§ 3.5, at 86. 
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Frondistou-Yannas,4 affirmed the legal standard applied by the Massa-
chusetts Appeals Court, and held that in determining the best interests 
of the child in removal cases, courts must take into account the interests 
of the custodial parent. 5 The father and mother in Yannas v. Frondistou-
Yannas were granted a divorce in 1984.6 As a part of the divorce decree, 
the judge for the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court 
Department granted each parent joint legal custody of their two minor 
children. 7 The mother was granted physical custody of the children, and 
in addition was allowed to remove the children from Massachusetts to 
Greece.8 
The children's mother felt that a move to Greece would provide her 
with opportunities for professional growth and with greater financial 
security than she could obtain in the United States.9 While the mother 
had not found employment in Massachusetts, she had been offered em-
ployment in Greece. 10 She was a licensed engineer in Greece and was 
the first woman to be a member of the board of directors of the largest 
corporation in Greece. 11 In addition, she was an officer in the Greek 
National Science Foundation and a consultant to the Greek Secretary of 
Public Works. 12 Furthermore, if the mother resided in Greece, she would 
become entitled to a pension from the Greek government, and have 
access to real and personal property which she owned there. 13 
The probate judge concluded that a move to Greece would enhance 
the children's exposure to their Greek heritage and language. 14 The chil-
4 395 Mass. 704, 481 N .E.2d 1153 (1985). 
5 /d. at 706, 481 N.E.2d at 1155. 
6 /d. at 705, 481 N.E.2d at 1155. 
7 /d. at 706, 481 N.E.2d at 1155. 
8 /d. The probate judge gave the father the right to take the children for six weeks each 
summer, for one week at Christmas time, and for one week each spring, with the cost of 
transportation to be shared equally. /d. Furthermore, the judge awarded the wife alimony 
and child support in the amount of $300 a week. /d. Rulings pertaining to the distribution 
and division of property were also made. /d. 
9 /d. at 707, 481 N.E.2d at 1156. 
10 /d. 
II /d. 
12 /d. 
13 !d. 
14 /d. at 708, 481 N.E.2d at 1156. The family's association with Greece and their Greek 
heritage continued in spite of their residence in Massachusetts and their American citizen-
ship. /d. at 707, 481 N.E.2d at 1155. The children were fluent in both English and Greek 
and were cared for by Greek live-in babysitters who spoke Greek almost exclusively. /d. 
The children received five hours of instruction in Greek each week. !d. at 707,481 N.E.2d 
at 1155-56. Furthermore, the family traveled to Greece each summer from 1975 to 1981, 
except for the year in which their son was born. /d. at 707, 481 N.E.2d at 1156. The 
husband held at the time of trial an interest in an apartment and a cemetery tomb in Athens. 
2
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dren were familiar with Greek culture and both grandmothers as well as 
various cousins, aunts, and uncles lived in Greece. 15 In addition, the 
children had been accepted for admission at a highly regarded school in 
Greece. 16 Furthermore, the probate judge concluded that the stress on 
the wife and her unhappiness if forced to remain in Massachusetts would 
probably have an adverse effect on the children. 17 
Both parties appealed the probate judge's decision. 18 The father ap-
pealed the custody award and the judge's authorization for removal of 
the children from Massachusetts. 19 The father also challenged the award 
of alimony. 20 The mother appealed the property division portion of the 
order. 21 The Supreme Judicial Court granted the husband's request for 
direct appellate review. 22 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, held 
that the interests of the custodial parent should be considered in deciding 
whether it is in the child's best interests to allow him or her to be removed 
from the Commonwealth without the consent of both parents. 23 In so 
holding, the Court endorsed the application of the "real advantage" stan-
/d. He traveled to Greece every summer between 1969 and 1981 and lectured frequently 
in Athens. /d. 
15 /d. at 708, 481 N.E.2d at 1156. 
16Jd. 
17 /d. From his basic findings, the probate judge concluded that the mother felt more 
secure in her native land. /d. 
ISJd. at 706, 481 N.E.2d at 1155. 
19Jd. 
20 !d. 
21fd. 
22 /d. After reviewing the probate court's findings of fact, the Supreme Judicial Court 
addressed the husband's contention that there should be a presumption in favor of joint 
physical custody of minor children. /d. at 708-09, 481 N.E.2d at 1156-57. The Court held 
that there is no such presumption. /d. at 708, 481 N.E.2d at 1156. The Court did acknowl-
edge a tendency in this country to favor joint legal custody of minor children, which is 
defined in G.L. c. 208, § 31 (1984) as "a continued mutual responsibility and involvement 
by both parents in decisions regarding the child's welfare in matters of education, medical 
care, emotional, moral and religious development." Yannas, 395 Mass. at 708-09, 481 
N.E.2d at 1156. To the Court's knowledge, however, no state had adopted by judicial 
decision a presumption in favor of joint physical custody. /d. at 709, 481 N.E.2d at 1157. 
In addition, the Court noted that a 1983 proposal that G.L. c. 208, § 31 be amended, to 
provide that "[t]here shall be a presumption that an award of joint custody is in the best 
interests of the minor child," S. 2080 (1983), was not incorporated that year in the most 
recent amendment of§ 31, 1983 MASS. AcTs c. 695. The Court found no reason to believe 
that joint physical custody is presumptively desirable in all child custody matters and 
concluded that the question of physical custody should be left to the judge's determination 
unfettered by any presumption in favor of joint physical custody. Yannas, 395 Mass. at 
709, 481 N.E.2d at 1157. 
23 /d. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157-58. 
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dard in removal decisions. 24 The Court noted that the "real advantage" 
standard was adopted by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals in Hale v. 
Ha/e,25 and has been followed, with some variations, in most jurisdictions 
which have addressed the issue. 26 The "real advantage" standard provides 
for a two-tiered decision-making process to determine whether removal 
without the noncustodial parent's consent is in the child's best interests. 27 
First, a court must determine whether the move would provide the 
custodial parent with a "real advantage. "28 The Court stated that the "real 
advantage" test is grounded in the recognition that a child's relationship 
with both parents after a divorce cannot be the same as it was before the 
divorce, and that it is the custodial parent who provides the child's quality 
and style of life. 29 Since a child's best interests are "so interwoven with 
the well-being of the custodial parent," the Court held that an accurate 
assessment of the interests of the child requires that the court consider 
the custodial parent's interests. 30 
In assessing the sincerity of the "real advantage" asserted by the 
custodial parent, the Court noted that the relative advantages to the 
custodial parent resulting from the move, the soundness of the reason 
for moving, and the presence or absence of a motive to deprive the 
noncustodial parent of reasonable visitation are relevant considerations.31 
24 Id. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157. In affirming the probate judge's application of the real 
advantage standard, the Court rejected the standard which is applied in New York, which, 
where there is no question of the fitness of the noncustodial parent and of his or her right 
to visitation, allows for removal only in exceptional circumstances. Id. See Weiss v. Weiss, 
52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380 (1981). 
25 12 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 818-19, 429 N.E.2d 340, 344 (1981). The Hale court adopted 
the less strict standard as set forth in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206-
07, 365 A.2d 27, 30, aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (1976). Yannas, 
395 Mass. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157. The real advantage standard has been rearticulated 
recently by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 53-56, 491 
A.2d 606, 611-13 (1984). See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157. 
26 Yannas, 395 Mass. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157. See, e.g., Hale at 819, 429 N.E.2d 344; 
In reMarriage of Brady, 115 Ill. App. 3d 521, 523, 450 N.E.2d 985, 986 (1983) (custodial 
parent presents prima facie case by showing a sensible reason for the move, and "a showing 
that the move is consistent with the child's best interests"); Jordan v. Jordan, 50 Md. App. 
437, 444-46, 439 A.2d 26, 29-30 (1982); Bielawski v. Bielawski, 137 Mich. App. 587, 593, 
358 N.W.2d 383, 386 (1984); Matter of Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1981) ("The 
majority of cases dealing with removal of a child from the jurisdiction support the rule that 
if a parent who has custody of a child has good reason for living in another state, removal 
will be permitted, providing such a move is consistent with the best interests of the child."). 
27 Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711-12, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. 
28 Id. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. 
29 Id. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157. 
30 ld. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157-58 (quoting Cooper, 99 N.J. at 54, 491 A.2d at 612). 
31 /d. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. 
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The Court stated, however, that merely because the move is in the best 
interests of the custodial parent, it is not "automatically in the best 
interests of the child."32 The Court stressed that the best interests of the 
child remain the paramount concern in determining whether the custodial 
parent should be permitted to remove the child from the state. 33 
If a sound reason for leaving the Commonwealth exists, then the court 
must consider whether the move is in the child's best interests. The 
Court stated that in evaluating the child's best interests, the effect that 
any removal might have on the child is of great significance.34 According 
to the Court, it is important to consider whether the quality of the child's 
life might be improved by the change, either directly or as a result of an 
improvement in the quality of the custodial parent's life. 35 In addition, 
the Court stated that attention should be given to the possible adverse 
effect of the child's reduced association with the noncustodial parent, 
and the extent to which a move might affect the child's emotional, 
physical, or developmental needs. 36 
Furthermore, the Court stated that removal decisions should include 
an assessment of the interests of the noncustodial parent as well as of 
the custodial parent. 37 In assessing the interests of the noncustodial par-
ent, the Court stated that the reasonableness of alternative visitation 
arrangements should be weighed. 38 The Court noted, however, that the 
fact that visitation by the noncustodial parent might become more difficult 
could not be controlling. 39 
In deciding the best interests of the child, the Court stressed that the 
interests of both parents and of the child must be considered collec-
tively. 40 The Court noted that it is the role of the probate court to protect 
the interests of both parents and the child by careful factfinding rather 
32 /d. 
33 /d. at 710,481 N.E.2d at 1157. 
34 /d. at 711,481 N.E.2d at 1158. The Court stated that in removal decisions generally a 
court will not give particular weight to the child's preference as to where he or she should 
live. /d. at 713, 481 N.E.2d at ll59; see Hale, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 820, 429 N.E.2d at 
345. The Court noted that even if the child's preference against moving is entitled to 
recognition as a constitutional right, a court still must consider the child's interest together 
with the rights of the parents and the interests of the state. Yannas, 395 Mass. at 713, 481 
N .E.2d at 1159. According to the Court, where a court carefully .:onsiders the best interests 
of the child, the court provides adequate protection of the child's constitutional and other 
rights. !d. 
35 /d. at 7ll, 481 N.E.2d at ll58. 
36 !d. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. 
39 /d. 
40 /d. at 7ll-12, 481 N.E.2d at ll58. 
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than by imposing heightened burdens of proof or by inequitably identi-
fying constitutional rights in favor of one person over another.41 
After delineating the factors to be considered in determining the child's 
best interests, the Yannas v. Frondistou- Yannas Court found that the 
probate judge had not abused his discretion in authorizing the wife to 
remove the children to Greece. 42 The Court found that the probate judge 
had made findings of fact consistent with the "real advantage" standard 
which indicated that the move to Greece would provide financial, emo-
tional, and social advantages to the children's mother.43 First, the probate 
judge found that the children could benefit from such advantages and 
could strengthen their cultural and family ties. 44 Additionally, according 
to the probate judge, the children's father had large blocks of free time 
and traveled to Greece frequently. 45 Finally, the probate court found that 
the children could continue to visit the United States and maintain their 
American citizenship.46 Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court determined 
that the probate judge, upon the threshold showing of real advantage to 
the custodial parent, collectively considered the interests of both parents 
and the children in determining the best interests of the children, and 
that a decision in favor of removal was supported by adequate findings 
of fact. 47 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Yannas v. Frandostou-Yan-
nas is an affirmation of the pragmatic approach to removal decisions 
adopted by the Massachusetts Appeals Court in Hale v. Hale. The Yan-
nas v. Frandostou-Yannas opinion, like the Hale v. Hale opinion, directs 
41 Id. at 712, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. 
42 ld. 
43 Id. 
44 ld. 
45 Id. 
46 ld. The record also indicated that Greek courts would enforce custody orders entered 
in this country. Id. at 707, 481 N.E.2d at 1156. 
47 Id. at 712, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. The Court disposed of the other objections of the 
husband summarily. First, the Court held that the probate judge did not err in admitting 
into evidence the report of the guardian ad litem, appointed under G.L. c. 215, § 56a (1984), 
concerning the care and custody of the minor children. Id. at 713,481 N.E.2d at 1159. The 
guardian ad litem testified before the court and was available for cross-examination. Id. 
Second, the Court concluded that the report of a family service officer, which comments 
on the guardian ad litem's report and appears on the record, is not an improper report to 
the judge providing information not of record. Id. at 713-14, 481 N.E.2d at 1159. The 
husband did not show that the judge relied on the report to the husband's prejudice in any 
respect. ld. at 714, 481 N.E.2d at 1159. Third, the Court stated that the judge dealt properly 
with the testimony and report of a psychologist appointed as an expert under MAss. R. 
DoM. REL. P. 35, on motion of the husband, to examine the wife. Id. at 714, 481 N.E.2d 
at 1159-60. Fourth, the Court concluded that the judge's award of alimony to the wife was 
warranted by the evidence. Id. at 714, 481 N.E.2d at 1160. In addition, the Court held that 
the judge did not abuse his discretion in his division of the marital assets. !d. 
6
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trial courts to consider the custodial parent's well-being in determining 
the best interests of the child in removal decisions. 48 This approach, 
while preserving the view that the best interests of the child must govern 
the decision, recognizes the impact that a custodial parent's well-being 
ultimately has on the child's well-being. 49 
· The approach adopted in Yannas v. Frandistou- Yannas balances the 
conflicting interests of parents engaged in a custody battle. The two-
tiered "real advantage" standard requires that the custodial parent first 
demonstrate a sincere and well-motivated reason for wanting to move 
out of the Commonwealth. 5° Then, under Yannas v. Frandistou-Yannas, 
the probate court must consider the noncustodial parent's interest in 
maintaining a relationship with the child and must assess the possibility 
of alternative visitation arrangements.s' 
The Court's adoption of the "real advantage" standard properly rec-
ognizes that in our highly mobile society, career advancement often 
requires one to be geographically flexible. As the Yannas v. Frandistou-
Yannas Court noted, after a divorce the custodial parent is responsible 
for the child's quality and style of life, and therefore, to the extent that 
a career opportunity might provide the custodial parent with benefits of 
both a professional and financial nature, removal of a minor child from 
the state should be permitted. Furthermore, by directing the trial courts 
to assess the possibility of alternative visitation arrangements, the Court 
acknowledged that while it is important to consider the child's need to 
maintain a relationship with the noncustodial parent, weekly visitation in 
and of itself does not foster the relationship and longer visitation arrange-
ments might be preferable. Application of the "real advantage" standard 
suggests that if the custodial parent can demonstrate some professional, 
financial, emotional or social advantage to moving, then a court will 
likely allow a custodial parent to remove a minor child from the Com-
monwealth, provided that the noncustodial parent can arrange visitation 
with the child. 
§ 4.2. Divorce - Alimony and Assignment of Property.* In the 1977 
decision Rice v. Rice, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court determined that under 
48 /d. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157-58. 
49 See id. 
50 ld. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. 
51 Id. 
* Sarah Borstel Porter, Executive Editor, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.2 1 372 Mass. 398, 361 N.E.2d 1305 (1977). For an analysis of Rice, see Inker, 
Perocchi, & Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 1.2 at 7-11. 
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section 34 of chapter 208 of the General Laws,2 a court may assign to 
one party in a divorce proceeding all or part of the separate nonmarital 
property of the other party in addition to or in lieu of alimony. 3 In 
expansive language, the Court declared that section 34 "gives the trial 
judge discretion to assign to one spouse property of the other spouse 
whenever and however acquired. "4 During the Survey year, the Massa-
chusetts Appeals Court, in a case of first impression, addressed the issue 
whether property interests acquired after the dissolution of marriage are 
subject to division under section 34.5 Limiting the broad language in 
Rice, the court held in Davidson v. Davidson6 that property interests 
subject to division under section 34 are to be identified as of the time of 
the divorce. 7 Applying this principle, the court found that a remainder 
interest under a testamentary trust was a sufficient property interest to 
be considered in connection with property division,8 but that no extraor-
dinary circumstances supported treating an expectancy under a will as 
part of the divisible estate.9 
In Davidson, five years after the parties were divorced by a judgment 
entered as absolute, 10 the wife filed a complaint seeking assignment of 
2 G.L. c. 208, § 34 as amended by St. 1983, c. 233, § 77 provides in pertinent part: 
Upon divorce or upon a complaint in an action brought at any time after a divorce, 
... the court ... may make a judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to 
the other. In addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony, the court may 
assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. In 
determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be paid, or in fixing the nature and 
value of the property, if any, to be so assigned, the court, ... shall consider the 
length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, 
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, em-
ployability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of 
each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also consider 
the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation 
in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a 
homemaker to the family unit .... 
3 372 Mass. 398, 401, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1307. 
4 /d. at 400, 361 N.E.2d at 1307 (emphasis added). 
5 Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 474 N.E.2d 1137 (1985). 
6Jd. 
7 /d. at 370, 474 N.E.2d at 1143. 
8 /d. at 372, 474 N.E.2d at 1144. 
9 /d. at 374, 474 N.E.2d at 1145. 
10 /d. at 365, 474 N.E.2d at 1140. G.L. c. 208, § 21 provides: 
Judgments of divorce shall in the first instance be judgments nisi, and shall become 
absolute after the expiration of ninety days from the entry thereof, unless the court 
within said period, for sufficient cause, upon application of any party to the action, 
otherwise orders. Mter the entry of a judgment nisi, the action shall not be dismissed 
or discontinued on motion of either party except upon such terms, if any, as the 
court may order after notice to the other party and a hearing, unless there has been 
8
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marital property under chapter 208, section 34. 11 The complaint alleged 
that at the time of the divorce the husband had an irrevocable remainder 
interest under a testamentary trust and an expectancy under the will of 
his mother. 12 At the time the complaint was filed, the interest under the 
trust had vested in possession and the expectancy had ripened into an 
inheritance. 13 The probate court, considering these assets to be subject 
to division under chapter 208, section 34, entered a judgment ordering 
the husband to pay the wife $45,000 as a division of marital property. 14 
Appealing the judgment, the husband argued that since the testamentary 
trust interest and the inheritance did not come into his possession until 
after the judgment of divorce absolute, 15 they constituted after-acquired 
property and thus were not part of his estate subject to division under 
the statute. 16 
The Appeals Court determined that to the extent that the probate judge 
considered after-acquired property in the section 34 action, there was 
error requiring reversal of the judgment. 17 In reaching this conclusion, 
the court stated that the purpose of section 34 is to provide for the 
equitable division of the property interests of partners in a marriage. 18 
This equitable division of property interests, the court continued, is made 
in recognition of the contribution made to the marital partnership. 19 The 
court concluded that the application of section 34 to property interests 
acquired after the dissolution of the marriage would be contrary to the 
marital partnership concept on which section 34 is founded. 20 Therefore, 
the court held, property interests subject to division under section 34 are 
filed with the court a memorandum signed by both parties, wherein they agree to 
such disposition of the action. 
11 /d. at 366, 474 N .E.2d at 1140. 
12 /d. at 368, 474 N.E.2d at 1142. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. at 366, 474 N.E.2d at 1141. 
15 The husband first argued that the wife was precluded from seeking an assignment of 
property by the judgment of divorce. /d. at 367, 474 N .E.2d at 1141. The court noted that 
a judgment of divorce only settles issues which were actually tried and determined. /d. 
(quoting Maze v. Mihalovich, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 323, 326, 387 N.E.2d 196, 198 (1979)). 
Because the judge who heard the divorce action made no findings of fact, the appeals court 
was unable to determine whether any question of assignment was litigated in the divorce 
proceeding. /d. at 367, 474 N .E.2d at 1142. In conclusion, the court held that the judgment 
of divorce did not preclude litigation of the issues raised in the complaint for the assignment 
of property. /d. at 368,474 N.E.2d at 1142. 
16 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 369,474 N.E.2d 1137, 1142. 
17 /d. at 375, 474 N.E.2d at 1146. 
18 Id. at 369, 474 N.E.2d at 1142-43. 
19 /d. at 369-70, 474 N.E.2d at 1143 (citing Inker, Walsh & Perocchi, Alimony and 
Assignment of Property: The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, 110 SUFFOLK U .L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1975)). 
20 /d. at 370,474 N.E.2d at 1143. 
9
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to be identified as of the time of the divorce. 21 In a footnote, the court 
stated that in this case it makes no difference whether property is iden-
tified as of the time of the divorce trial, the judgment nisi or the judgment 
absolute, as the situation was the same at all those times.22 The court 
emphasized that it was not suggesting a rule fixing any of those dates, or 
excluding some earlier time, such as the date of separation, as determi-
native in identifying divisible property.23 Rather, the court stated that 
development of the law in this respect is best left to case-by-case anal-
ysis.24 Distinguishing Rice, the court noted that the "whenever and how-
ever acquired" language in context referred to property acquired by the 
husband before the marriage and as gifts during the marriage, not after 
dissolution of the marital partnership. 25 
Turning to the property interests as they existed at the time of the 
divorce, the court held that the husband's remainder interest under the 
testamentary trust constituted a sufficient property interest to make it 
part of his estate for consideration in connection with a property division 
under section 34.26 The court recognized that the trustees were empow-
ered in their uncontrolled discretion to invade the principal for the benefit 
of the husband's mother27 and that the remainder was subject to a valid 
spendthrift provision. 28 However, noting that a more expansive approach 
than the wooden application of rules of the law of property is appropriate 
in determining the content of the estates of divorcing parties,29 the court 
found it sufficient that the husband's right to the remainder was fixed at 
the time of the divorce, subject only to the conditions of survivorship.30 
The court added that it did not think that the uncertainty of value or the 
inalienability of the interest were sufficient to preclude consideration of 
the interest as subject to division. 31 The court was quick to point out that 
it did not suggest that a judge must divide such an interest, but that the 
determination whether to include a particular interest in the property to 
be divided lies within the sound discretion of the judge after consideration 
of all of the factors enumerated in section 34.32 
21 /d. 
22 /d. at 370 n.9, 474 N .E.2d at 1143 n.9. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. 
25 !d. at 370, 474 N.E.2d at 1143. 
26 /d. at 372, 474 N.E.2d at 1144. 
27 /d. at 371, 474 N.E.2d at 1143. 
28 /d. at 371, 474 N.E.2d at 1144. 
29 /d. 
30 /d. at 372, 474 N.E.2d at 1144. The remainder interest was to be distributed free of 
trust when his mother died and/or when he reached age thirty-five. !d. at 371, 474 N.E.2d 
at 1143. 
31 /d. at 372, 474 N .E.2d at 1144. 
32 /d. at 373,474 N.E.2d at 1144-45. The§ 34 factors include the length of the marriage, 
10
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The court further held that where the division of property under section 
34 takes place after the divorce, the property subject to division is to be 
valued as of the date of the order of division. 33 Accordingly, the court 
stated that the judge was correct in valuing the husband's remainder 
interest under the trust on the basis of the distribution from the trust 
received at the time of trial. 34 Because the division was made at a time 
when the remainder interest had vested in possession, the question of 
valuation presented no problem in this case. 35 The court pointed out, 
however, that in the case where such an interest has not vested at the 
time of trial and where there is no spendthrift limitation, guidance in 
determining valuation may be found in cases dealing with pension inter-
ests.36 The court added that in cases where it is not feasible to fashion 
an equitable judgment, the judge, in a careful exercise of discretion, may 
decide to reserve the question of division of property, and retain juris-
diction.J7 
Addressing the issue of the husband's expectancy under his mother's 
will, the court concluded that such expectancies generally should be 
excluded from the definition of property subject to division under section 
34. 38 The court stated that at the time of the divorce, the husband's 
the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount 
and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of the 
parties, and the opportunity of future acquisition of capital assets and income. G.L. c. 208, 
§ 34. The court may consider the contribution of each of the parties to the estate and as a 
homemaker to the family unit. Id. See supra note 2 for the text of G.L. c. 208, § 34. 
The court held that the marital partnership concept embodied in § 34 dictates that in the 
Davidson case, the factors be examined as of the date of the divorce. Davidson, 19 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 375, 474 N.E.2d at 1146. The court emphasized that it did not reach the question 
which may arise where property is acquired or circumstances change between the entry of 
the judgments nisi and absolute. /d. at 375 n.15, 474 N.E.2d at ll46 n.15. Nor would the 
court comment on factual situations which might indicate the use of an earlier date for 
application of some or all of the factors. /d. at 376 n.15, 474 N.E.2d 1146 n.15. 
33 Id. at 376, 474 N.E.2d at 1147. 
34 Id. at 377, 474 N.E.2d at ll47. 
35 /d. at 373 n.12, 474 N .E.2d at ll45 n.12. 
36 Id. (citing Dewan v. Dewan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 455 N.E.2d 1236 (1983)). In Dewan, 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court stated that in dividing nonvested pension rights, the court 
may be able to determine present value, but if the court concludes that because of uncer-
tainties affecting the vesting it should not attempt to divide the present value of pension 
rights, it can award each spouse an appropriate portion of each pension payment as it is 
paid. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 101, 455 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (1983) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 
126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561 (1976)). The court added that the deter-
mination whether to assign a percentage of present value as a property asset or to allocate 
benefits if and when received lies within the judge's discretion. ld. at 101-02, 455 N.E.2d 
at 1240. 
37 Id. The court does not indicate when the question of division of property should be 
decided when an equitable judgment as to valuation cannot be made at the date of trial. 
38 Jd. at 374, 474 N.E.2d at ll45. 
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mother was alive and could have changed her will. 39 In addition, the 
court noted, the determination of an expectancy as a property interest 
might involve lengthy trial of issues collateral to the section 34 action 
such as the validity of the will, testamentary capacity, and valuation of 
the estates of others.40 The court concluded that the record showed no 
extraordinary circumstances which would support treating the expec-
tancy as a part of the husband's estate for consideration in connection 
with a property division under section 34.41 However, the court added, 
although the expectancy itself is not a divisible property interest, it might 
be considered under the section 34 criterion of "opportunity of each for 
future acquisition of capital assets and income" in determining what 
disposition to make of the property which is subject to division.42 The 
court thus determined that the judge's findings indicated that she may 
have considered after-acquired property in determining the husband's 
estate and to the extent she did so, the court concluded there was error. 43 
Davidson is consistent with the statutory intent of an equitable assign-
ment of property under the marital partnership concept embodied in 
section 34.44 The partnership concept is based on a division of property 
commensurate with the partners' contribution to the marital relation-
ship.45 In a situation where a spouse has acquired property after the 
dissolution of the marriage, that after-acquired property has no relation 
to the marital partnership. This situation is in direct contrast to the 
situation in Rice, where the property in question was acquired before 
and during the marriage and constituted the only means of support during 
the marriage. 46 In contrast to the Rice court's broad inclusion of "all 
property whenever and however acquired" within the definition of a 
spouse's estate, the Davidson court's exclusion of property acquired after 
the dissolution of marriage from the definition of the divisible estate is 
consistent with the equitable division purpose of the statute. 
Although the Davidson decision restricts the expansiveness of the Rice 
language, the decision leaves ample room for a broad interpretation of 
property subject to division. Although the Davidson court held that after-
acquired property is not a property interest subject to division under the 
statute, the court leaves to a trial judge's discretion the issue whether 
39 ld. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. 
42 ld. at 374-75, 474 N.E.2d at 1146 (emphasis in original). 
43 Id. at 375, 474 N.E.2d at 1146. 
44 See Inker, Walsh & Perocchi, Alimony and Assignment of Property: The New Statutory 
Scheme in Massachusetts, 10 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 4-6. 
45 See Inker & Clower, Towards a New Justice in Marital Dissolution: The Massachusetts 
Statutory Scheme and Due Process Analysis, 16 SuFFOLK U.L. REV. 907,935-36 (1982). 
46 See Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 399, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1306. 
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there is a sufficient property interest at the time of divorce so as to be 
part of the estate for purposes of the statute. In effect, the Appeals Court 
has left the meaning of "after-acquired" property to be shaped on a case-
by-case basis by the lower courts. While the court recognized that the 
Davidson fact situation tested the outer limits of a sufficient property 
interest, it nevertheless held that a remainder interest under a discretion-
ary trust subject to a valid spendthrift provision was a sufficient property 
interest to be part of an estate for purposes of section 34.47 The court 
reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that a discretionary trust may 
be depleted entirely at the discretion of the trustee, leaving nothing for 
the remainder and that a remainder subject to a spendthrift provision 
may not be reached to satisfy any judgment or debt. 48 Furthermore, 
although the court held that in general an expectancy under a will is 
excluded from the definition of property subject to division under the 
statute, it implied that under some circumstances an expectancy could 
be a sufficient property interest as to be part of the estate. 49 In conclusion, 
the Appeals Court in Davidson rejected the inflexible application of rules 
of the law of property and gave the lower courts the broad discretion 
necessary to an equitable division of property. 
Davidson has left a number of finer points to be clarified by the lower 
courts in the future. For example, the court held that property interests 
subject to division under section 34 are to be identified as of the time of 
divorce. However, by not determining whether the property is identified 
as of the time of separation, the divorce trial, the judgment nisi, or the 
judgment absolute, the court has in effect held that identification of 
property interests should occur no later than the time of divorce. In light 
of the amount of time that may pass between any of these dates, the 
composition of the estate for the purposes of the statute may vary greatly 
depending upon the date chosen. The court leaves unclear whether a rule 
will be developed setting one of these dates as determinative or whether 
equitable considerations will again control. The latter position is sug-
gested by the court's language and would be in keeping with the court's 
expansive approach. The court has also left open the means by which 
property subject to division is to be valued in cases less clear cut than 
Davidson. In cases where a remainder interest has not vested, the court 
suggests that cases dealing with pension interests may provide guidance. 50 
Consistent with the court's approach of affording broad discretion to the 
47 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 372, 474 N.E.2d at 1144. 
48 /d. at 371,474 N.E.2d at 1143-44. 
49 Id. at 374, 474 N.E.2d at 1145. The court uses the phrase "extraordinary circum-
stances," but does not indicate what those circumstances would be. See id. 
50 Id. at 373 n.12, 474 N.E.2d at 1145 n.12 (citing Dewan v. Dewan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 
97, 455 N.E.2d 1236 (1983)). 
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lower courts, the Davidson court leaves the development of "thoughtful 
solutions" to valuation problems to a case-by-case resolution by trial 
judges.51 
In summary, the Appeals Court has demonstrated its commitment to 
a construction of section 34 that results in an equitable division of prop-
erty as intended by the statute. In holding that the inclusion of after-
acquired property in the definition of the estate subject to division is 
impermissible, the court has tempered the broad language of Rice allow-
ing the assignment of property regardless of when acquired. However, 
Davidson allows a broad interpretation of a property interest sufficient 
to be considered for purposes of the statute. The court makes clear that 
it is an equitable distribution and not a rigid application of the laws of 
property that controls the division of property under chapter 208, section 
34. 
§ 4.3. Adoption-Petition of Licensed Private Child Care Agency to Dis-
pense With Parental Consent-Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof.* 
Chapter 210, section 3 of the Massachusetts General Laws permits adop-
tion without parental consent where the probate court finds, upon con-
sideration of the parents' fitness, that adoption is in the best interests of 
the child. 1 Formerly, Massachusetts courts enforced a statutory pre-
sumption that adoption was in a child's best interests where the state 
department of social services or a licensed private child care agency had 
care or custody of a child for more than a year and then petitioned to 
dispense with parental consent to adoption. 2 In 1982, however, the Su-
51 ld. at 373-74 n.l2, 474 N.E.2d at 1145 n.l2. 
*Janet K. Adachi, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.3. 1 G.L. c. 210, § 3(a)(ii), (c) (1984). 
Adoption of a child 12 years of age or younger ordinarily requires parental consent. See 
G.L. c. 210, § 2 (1984). Adoption of a child over 12 years of age requires the consent of 
either the child or the parents. /d. 
2 G.L. c. 210, § 3(c) (1984) (presumption invalidated in Petition of the Dep't of Social 
Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 389 Mass. 793, 802-03, 452 N.E.2d 497, 503 
(1983)). 
G.L. c. 210, § 3 (1984) provides: 
(b) The department of social services or any licensed child care agency may 
commence a proceeding, independent of a petition for adoption, in the probate court 
... to dispense with the need for consent [of the parents] to the adoption of a child 
in the care or custody of said department or agency . . . . The court shall issue a 
decree dispensing with the need for said consent or notice of any petition for adoption 
of such child subsequently sponsored by said department or agency if it finds that 
the best interests of the child ... will be served by said decree. Pending a hearing 
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preme Court held in Santosky v. Kramer3 that a state must justify ter-
mination of parental rights to a child by clear and convincing evidence. 4 
The Supreme Court's Santosky decision led to the Supreme Judicial 
Court's invalidation of the Massachusetts statutory presumption in 1983,5 
and application of the clear and convincing standard of proof to a state 
agency petitioning to dispense with parental consent to adoption. 6 
During the Survey year, in Petition of the Catholic Charitable Bureau 
of the Archdiocese of Boston, Inc. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption 
(Catholic Charitable Bureau)/ the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the 
application of the clear and convincing standard of proof to a licensed 
private child care agency petitioning to dispense with parental consent 
to adoption of a child in the agency's custody.8 The Court also indicated 
that the probate judge's decision to dispense with parental consent was 
proper, notwithstanding the judge's reference to the not yet invalidated 
statutory presumption that adoption is in the best interests of the child.9 
Because the probate judge's conclusion that the agency had met its 
burden of proof rested on evidence rather than on the presumption, the 
Court found no reason to invalidate the judge's decision. 10 
In Catholic Charitable Bureau, the child in dispute was born in 1979 
and, along with an older brother, lived with his mother. 11 The child's 
father, an alcoholic with a criminal record and a history of violence, 12 
was divorced from the mother in 1973 but continued to be a disruptive 
on the merits of a petition filed under this paragraph, temporary custody may be 
awarded to the petitioner. 
(c) .... 
In determining whether the best interests of the child will be served by issuing a 
decree dispensing with the need of consent as permitted under paragraph (b), the 
court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of the child's parents 
... to assume parental responsibility, and shall also consider the plan proposed by 
the department or other agency initiating the petition. 
3 455 u.s. 745 (1982). 
4 Id. at 769. 
5 Petition of the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 389 Mass. 
793, 802-03, 452 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1983). 
6 Id. Massachusetts thereby joined the majority of states that already had adopted the 
clear and convincing evidence or comparable standard of proof with regard to state ter-
mination of parental rights. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 & n.3, 769 (1982). 
7 395 Mass. 180, 479 N.E.2d 148 (1985). 
8 Id. at 184, 479 N.E.2d at 151. 
9 Id. at 187-88, 479 N.E.2d at 153-54. 
1o Id. 
11 Id. at 181, 479 N.E.2d at 150. The mother's sister had adopted the mother's third child. 
/d. 
12 Id. 
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factor in the mother's lifeY Conditions in the mother's home were 
squalid14 and the mother, overwhelmed by personal and family problems, 
provided little emotional support to her children. 15 At the recommenda-
tion of a social worker, the mother enrolled in a therapeutic infant-toddler 
program, but her preoccupation with personal problems and erratic par-
ticipation limited the therapy's effectiveness. 16 A psychiatrist who ex-
amined the child diagnosed the child as suffering from severe neglect. 17 
The damage to the child was so severe, the psychiatrist concluded, that 
only a concerted effort would. restore the child's physical and mental 
health. 18 
In the spring of 1981, a lack of funds and inability to provide adequate 
housing prompted the mother to voluntarily place both children in foster 
care with the Catholic Family Services of Lynn. 19 The older brother 
eventually was returned to his mother, but the younger child remained 
in foster care.20 A social worker who visited the child in foster care a 
year later observed that the formerly unresponsive child was cheerful, 
happy and verbalizing well. 21 
In December 1981, the Catholic Charitable Bureau of the Archdiocese 
of Boston, Inc. (the Bureau), which earlier had been granted temporary 
guardianship with custody of the child, filed a petition to dispense with 
13 /d. That the father remained a part of the mother's life long after the 1973 divorce is 
evident from the fact of the child's birth in 1979. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 656,659,469 N.E.2d 
1277, 1279 (1984). 
14 395 Mass. at '182, 479 N.E.2d at 150. A social worker visiting the home observed 
broken windows, a lack of heat and electricity and a permeating odor of urine. /d. 
15 /d. The mother was an alcoholic who attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings nightly, 
received financial support from the Department of Public Welfare, and spent most of her 
time playing cards and socializing at a social club. /d. 
16Jd. 
17 /d. at 182, 479 N.E.2d at 151. 
Teachers in the infant-toddler program, concerned by the child's arrested emotional 
development, had arranged for the psychiatric evaluation, which took place in May 1981. 
18 Mass. App. Ct. at 658, 469 N.E.2d at 1278. The psychiatrist observed that the child was 
uninterested in toys, except those in the shapes of foods, and uttered no words, other than 
the names of foods. /d. at 658, 469 N.E.2d at 1278-79. 
18 395 Mass. at 185, 479 N.E.2d at 152. 
19 /d. at 182, 479 N.E.2d at 150. It was the child's third foster care placement. /d. at 182 
& n.2, 479 N.E.2d at 152 & n.2. At the time of the foster care placements, the mother and 
father agreed to treatment for their personal problems so that the two children would be 
returned to their custody. 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 659, 469 N.E.2d at 1279. 
20 395 Mass. at 182, 479 N.E.2d at 150-51. The older brother was strongly attached to 
the mother and unhappy in foster care. /d. 
21 /d. at 182-83, 479 N.E.2d at 151. At the time of the social worker's visit in December 
1982, the child was in the proposed adoptive home where he had been placed in November. 
/d. 
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the need for parental consent to adoption of the child. 22 The parents were 
notified but only the mother filed an appearance, was appointed counsel, 23 
and testified at trial. 24 The probate judge concluded that dispensing with 
parental consent to adoption of the child would be in the child's best 
interests. 25 The Appeals Court affirmed, 26 holding that the record con-
tained clear and convincing evidence of the mother's current unfitness 
to care for the childY The Supreme Judicial Court granted further ap-
pellate review, 28 and affirmed. 29 
In upholding the probate judge's decision to dispense with the mother's 
consent to adoption of the child,30 the Court refuted the mother's chal-
lenge to the probate judge's findings of her unfitness and the need for 
termination of her parental rights in the best interests of the child. 31 The 
mother contended that neither finding was supported by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 32 The mother objected in particular to the judge's con-
sideration of the father's behavior in determining the mother's fitness, 
and to the judge's reference to the statutory presumption of chapter 210, 
section 3(c) that adoption is in the best interests of the childY Before 
responding to the mother's objections, the Court summarized the stan-
dard which a probate court applies in disposing of a petition to dispense 
with parental consent to adoption. 34 The Court explained that the critical 
22 /d. at 183, 479 N.E.2d at 151. The petition was filed with the Essex Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department. ld. 
Where a state or private agency files a petition under c. 210, § 3, § 3(c) requires that the 
agency submit to the probate court a plan detailing where the agency proposes to place 
the child if the petition is granted. While the plan need not identify prospective adoptive 
parents, it must provide enough information on the prospective parents and home to 
facilitate the judge's evaluation of the plan. Care and Protection of Three Minors, 392 
Mass. 704, 717, 467 N.E.2d 851, 860 (1984). 
23 395 Mass. at 183, 479 N.E.2d at 151. The father failed to appear and was defaulted. 
ld. The court-appointed guardian ad litem for the child recommended dispensing with the 
need for parental consent. /d. at 183 & n.3, 479 N.E.2d at 151 & n.3. 
24 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 661, 469 N.E.2d at 1280. Trial was in December 1982 and January 
1983. 395 Mass. at 183, 479 N.E.2d at 151. The mother was questioned as to how she 
proposed to care for the child, how she was coping with her alcoholism and with the father, 
and what sort of life she expected to make for herself. 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 661, 469 
N .E.2d at 1280. 
25 395 Mass. at 183, 479 N .E.2d at 151. The judge's decision was in April 1983. ld. 
26 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 663, 469 N.E.2d at 1281. 
27 /d. at 662, 469 N .E.2d at 1280-81. 
28 393 Mass. 1106, 474 N.E.2d 182 (1985). 
29 395 Mass. at 188, 479 N.E.2d at 154. 
30 Id. at 181, 479 N.E.2d at 150. 
31 Id. at 184, 187, 479 N.E.2d at 151, 153. 
32 Id. at 181, 479 N.E.2d at 150. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 183, 479 N.E.2d at 151. 
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issue is whether the natutal parents are currently fit to serve the best 
interests of the child. 35 Termination of parental rights to a child, the Court 
added, requires an affirmative showing that the parents are unfit by reason 
of grievous shortcomings that would pose a substantial risk to the child's 
welfare. 36 
Turning to the probate judge's finding of the mother's unfitness, the 
Court concluded that the Bureau had proven the mother's unfitness by 
clear and convincing evidence.J7 First, the Court stated, the probate judge 
could have concluded from the evidence of substandard living conditions 
and the psychiatrist's diagnosis that the living conditions were harmful 
to the child and had contributed to the child's deprivation. 38 Acknowl-
edging that the mother's poverty alone would not support a finding of 
unfitness,39 the Court cited additional evidence that the mother had se-
rious emotional problems which limited her capacity to nurture the child's 
development.40 The Court rejected the mother's assertions that her cus-
tody of the older brother and her voluntary placement of the child in 
foster care manifested her parental fitness. 41 The Court noted that chil-
dren have varying parental needs and a parent therefore may be a fit 
parent as to one child but an unfit parent as to another. 42 In addition, the 
Court cited the foster care placement as manifesting the mother's aware-
"/d. (citing Petitions of the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 
389 Mass. 793, 799, 452 N.E.2d 497, 501 (1983) (quoting Petition of the Dep't of Pub. 
Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 589, 421 N.E.2d 28, 37 
(1981))). 
36 Id. at 183-84, 479 N.E.2d at 151 (citing Petition of the Dep't of Social Servs. to 
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 391 Mass. 113, 118, 461 N .E.2d 186, 190 (1984) (quoting 
Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to 
Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 646, 328 N.E.2d 854, 863 (1975))). 
37 Id. at 184, 479 N.E.2d at 151 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982) 
and Petitions of the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 389 
Mass. 793, 803, 452 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1983)). 
38 Id. at 184, 479 N.E.2d at 152. 
39 Id. (citing Care and Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 713 n.12, 467 N.E.2d 
851, 858 n.12 (1984) and Custody of A Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 766, 452 N.E.2d 483, 490 
(1983)). 
40 ld. at 184-85, 479 N.E.2d at 152. The court noted that the mother's participation in 
the infant-toddler program consisted of sessions focusing primarily on the mother's prob-
lems rather than those of the child. Id. at 185, 479 N.E.2d at 152. Moreover, the court 
observed, after placing the child in foster care, the mother had not visited the child from 
November 1981 to March 1982 and, when she did visit, was upset and unaffectionate 
toward the child. Id. 
41 Id. at 185 & n.6, 479 N.E.2d at 152 & n.6. 
42 Id. at 185 n.6, 479 N.E.2d at 152 n.6 (citing Petition of the Dep't of Pub. Welfare to 
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 589, 421 N.E.2d 28, 37 (1981)). The 
court noted evidence indicating that the older son had fewer problems, was more indepen-
dent and required less parental attention than did the younger child. Id. 
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ness of her deficiencies rather than her fitness as a parent. 43 Given the 
paucity of information on the mother's current condition, the Court stated 
that the mother's pattern of neglect and unfitness in the past could be 
used to show her current unfitness. 44 In concluding on the issue of the 
mother's unfitness, the Court defended the probate judge's reliance on 
evidence of the father's unfitness to the extent that the father's behavior 
distracted the mother and diminished her fitness. 45 
The Court next considered the probate judge's finding that a termina-
tion of the child's relationship with the mother would be in the child's 
best interests. 46 The Court determined that the probate judge properly 
considered the child's transformation from the time of the psychiatric 
examination to the time of trial,47 and concluded that evidence of the 
positive change supported the judge's determination that adoption would 
be in the child's best interests. 48 Because the evidence adequately sup-
43 Id. at 185-86, 479 N.E.2d at 152. 
The court has indicated that a parent's voluntary relinquishment of custody for appropriate 
reasons is not sufficient in itself to support a finding of parental unfitness. See Petition of 
Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 391 Mass. 113, 120, 461 
N.E.2d 186, 191 (1984); Petitions of Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to 
Adoption, 389 Mass. 793, 801, 452 N.E.2d 497, 502-03 (1983) (citing Bezio v. Patenaude, 
381 Mass. 563, 577, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (1980)). 
44 395 Mass. at 185, 479 N.E.2d at 152 (citing Custody of A Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 
876, 883, 389 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1979)). 
45 Id. at 186, 479 N.E.2d at 152-53. The mother contended that the probate judge had 
found her "guilty by association" with the father, in violation of U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV 
and MASS. CoNST. amend. art. 106. ld. at 186, 479 N.E.2d at 152. The Court disposed of 
the mother's constitutional arguments on procedural grounds. ld. at 186 n.7, 479 N.E.2d 
at 153 n.7. 
For a different treatment of evidence pertaining to the father, see Petitions of the Dep't 
of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 482 N .E.2d 
535 (1985). There, the Appeals Court concluded that the probate judge's findings on the 
mother's current fitness improperly referred to the father's past behavior within the family, 
where the evidence indicated minimal contact between the father and mother since their 
separation approximately one year prior to triaL/d. at 695 & n.3, 482 N.E.2d at 539 & n.3. 
46 395 Mass at 186-87, 479 N.E.2d at 153. 
47 Id. A prospective custodian's ability to provide the child with more advantages than 
would the natural parents is not in itself sufficient reason for transferring custody from the 
natural parents. Custody of A Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 765, 452 N.E.2d 483, 489 (1983). 
48 395 Mass. at 187, 479 N.E.2d at 153. The court noted, however, that since the child 
had been with the adoptive parents for only six weeks at the time of trial, the probate judge 
improperly found that severing the child's bond with the adoptive parents would be detri-
mental. ld. 
Even where there is a lengthier placement and presumably deeper attachment of the 
child to the proposed adoptive parents, the court has indicated that the natural parents still 
may prevail in a custody dispute if they are fit to assume parental responsibility. See 
Petition of the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 391 Mass. 
113, 117-18, 461 N.E.2d 186, 189-90 (1984). 
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ported the judge's finding, the Court held that the judge's reference to 
the unconstitutional statutory presumption would not invalidate the pro-
bate judge's decision.49 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Catholic Charitable Bureau, 
applying the clear and convincing standard to private as well as public 
agencies,50 is consistent with the undifferentiated treatment that chapter 
210, section 3 accords state and private agencies seeking to dispense 
with parental consent to adoption. 51 In Santosky, bowever, the Supreme 
Court indicated that it is only where the state seeks to terminate parental 
rights to a child that the clear and convincing standard of proof is con-
stitutionally compelled.52 Hence, although the Supreme Judicial Court's 
adoption of the clear and convincing standard with regard to state agen-
cies is consistent with Santosky,53 it is not immediately apparent that due 
process compels application of the same standard of proof to private 
child care agencies. 
The Supreme Judicial Court did not cite reasons for its extension of 
the clear and convincing standard to private agencies. One justification, 
however, is that the private child care agency is performing a traditionally 
governmental function and therefore is subject to constitutional con-
straints to the same extent as the state.54 This theory would sustain 
application of the clear and convincing evidence standard where a private 
child care agency resembles a state agency in having sizable resources 
that confer an unfair advantage in termination proceedings,55 although 
the theory might not compel similar treatment of a private agency with 
fewer resources and services. The Supreme Court's reasoning in San-
tosky supports this analysis. In Santosky, the Supreme Court expressed 
concern that in state-initiated termination proceedings, the state's greater 
resources might enable the state to dominate the proceedings unfairly 
and bring about erroneous termination of parental custody. 56 To protect 
49 395 Mass. at 188,479 N.E.2d at 153-54. The court noted that the statutory presumption 
still was valid at the time of the probate judge's decision, and that the mother failed to 
request that the judge reconsider the findings after the court invalidated the presumption. 
ld. at 187 n.8, 479 N.E.2d at 153 n.8. 
'
0 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
" See supra notes 2-3. 
52 455 U.S. at 769. 
" See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
54 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 2%, 301-02 (1966) (private parties could not operate 
park, which was an essential public function, on segregated basis in violation of fourteenth 
amendment); cf Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (privately 
owned electric utility was not performing public function and therefore was not compelled 
by the fourteenth amendment to provide notice and hearing prior to termination of customer 
service). 
"See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-65 (1982). 
'
6 Id. at 763-64. 
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against erroneous termination of the parent's right to care and custody 
of the child, a right the Court considered important, 57 the Supreme Court 
concluded that the state must satisfy the elevated standard of proof 58 
embodied in the clear and convincing standard. 59 Similarly, the Supreme 
Judicial Court's adoption of the clear and convincing standard in Catholic 
Charitable Bureau may have been prompted by concern that private 
agencies such as the Bureau might dominate termination proceedings 
unfairly. 
While the Supreme Judicial Court might have adopted the higher stan-
dard of proof to curb any tendency of private adoption agencies to 
dominate termination proceedings, there is a more plausible explanation 
for the Catholic Charitable Bureau decision. Santosky suggests that the 
Constitution prohibits the probate court, as an arm of the state, from 
ordering termination of parental rights on the basis of less than clear and 
convincing evidence. First, the Supreme Court has indicated that state 
court decisions may be deemed state action and therefore subject to 
fourteenth amendment analysis. In Shelley v. Kraemer,60 for example, 
the Supreme Court held that state court enforcement of a private restric-
tive covenant in a residential property deed would be state action violat-
ing the fourteenth amendment. 61 Second, Santosky holds that the state 
may not terminate parental rights without abiding by the constitutionally 
compelled clear and convincing evidence standard. One reasonable con-
clusion is that a termination order premised on anything less than clear 
and convincing evidence is a violation of the natural parents' due process 
rights. Assuming that this state action analysis forms the basis for the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Catholic Charitable Bureau, any 
party petitioning to dispense with parental consent to adoption under 
chapter 210, section 3, whether the state, a private child care agency, or 
an individual,62 would have to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence 
standard. 63 
In Catholic Charitable Bureau, the Supreme Judicial Court's applica-
tion of the clear and convincing standard to the Bureau seems reasonable 
in light of Santosky and state action principles. While the Court did not 
57 /d. at 758-59. 
58 /d. at 763-64. 
59 /d. at 768-69. 
60 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 18-20 (1948) (court enforcement of private re-
strictive covenant against seller and buyer of home would violate fourteenth amendment). 
61 /d. at 18-20. 
62 G.L. c. 210, § 3(a) (1984) authorizes the filing of a petition for adoption without parental 
consent by "a person having the care of custody of a child." 
63 While the Shelley analysis would justify uniform treatment of agency and individual 
petitioners, the Supreme Judicial Court might prefer a different standard of proof with 
regard to individuals and smaller agencies. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
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state that it would apply the Catholic Charitable Bureau standard to all 
licensed private child care agencies, regardless of magnitude, one analysis 
would support a uniform requirement of clear and convincing evidence, 
without differentiation among petitioners under chapter 210, section 3. 
At a minimum, however, Catholic Charitable Bureau imposes a standard 
of clear and convincing evidence on large resource agencies petitioning 
to dispense with parental consent to adoption. 
§ 4.4. Preservation of the Right to Appeal After a Judgment of Divorce 
Nisi- Saltmarsh v. Saltmarsh. 1* Under Massachusetts law, a wife and 
husband may submit a sworn affidavit that an irretrievable breakdown of 
the marriage exists, execute a separation agreement, and with court 
approval, receive a court order under chapter 208, section 1A for what 
is commonly known as a no-fault divorce. 2 Normally, a judgment nisi is 
entered six months after the court order is issued. 3 Absent objections 
from either party, the judgment becomes absolute after the running of 
the nisi period of an additional six months.4 Objections to the judgment 
*James C. Duda, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.4. 1 395 Mass. 405, 480 N.E.2d 618 (1985). 
2 G.L. c. 208, § lA. Section lA provides, in pertinent part: 
An action for divorce on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage 
may be commenced with the filing of: (a) the complaint; (b) a sworn affidavit by 
both parties that an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage exists; and (c) a notar-
ized separation agreement executed by the parties .... [Within thirty days after a 
hearing on the agreement,] the court shall ... make a finding as to whether or not 
an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage exists and whether or not the agreement 
has made proper provisions for custody, for support and maintenance, for alimony 
and for the disposition of marital property, where applicable .... 
If the finding is in the affirmative, the court shall approve the agreement and it shall 
have the full force and effect of an order of the court and shall be incorporated and 
merged into said order, and by agreement of the parties it may also remain as an 
independent contract. In the event that the court does not approve the agreement 
as executed, or modified by agreement of the parties, said agreement shall become 
null and void and of no further effect between the parties . . . . 
Six months from the time that the court has given its initial approval to a dissolution 
agreement . . . a judgment of divorce nisi shall be entered without further action by 
the parties. 
3 /d. A judgment nisi is an interim judgment which will become final unless, upon 
application of either party, the court otherwise orders. Prior to the entry of the judgment 
nisi, the separation agreement may be modified by agreement of the parties with approval 
of the court or by petition of one of the parties after a showing of substantial change in 
circumstances. ld. 
4 G.L. c. 208, § 21. This section provides: 
Judgments of divorce shall in the first instance be judgments nisi, and shall become 
absolute after the expiration of six months from the entry thereof, unless the court 
within said period, for sufficient cause, upon application of any party to the action, 
otherwise orders. After the entry of a judgment nisi, the action shall not be dismissed 
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becoming absolute, however, may be filed during the nisi period pursuant 
to rule 58(c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations Proce-
dure, and the judgment will not become absolute until such objections 
are "disposed of by the court. "5 In addition, under rule 62(g), filing of an 
appeal will stay the running of the nisi period. 6 The rules do not explicitly 
address, however, whether rule 62(g) is applicable to an appeal of the 
dismissal of any rule 58(c) objection or limited only to appeals of the 
entry of a judgment of divorce nisi. Neither is it clear whether the 
dismissal of a rule 58(c) objection after the expiration of the nisi period 
automatically makes a nisi judgment absolute, causing an appeal of that 
dismissal to be moot. 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Giner v. Giner,? has held that an 
appeal of a dismissal of a rule 58( c) objection is moot if the appeal is filed 
after the six month nisi period has run, even though the objection was 
properly raised within the nisi period.8 In Giner, rule 58(c) objections 
were raised before the expiration of the six month nisi period.9 The 
objections were not dismissed until more than one year later. 10 Although 
the dismissal was appealed within a month, 11 the court ruled that the 
appeal was moot because, immediately upon dismissal of the rule 58(c) 
objections, the nisi period had run and the divorce judgment had become 
absolute. 12 
or discontinued on motion of either party except upon such terms, if any, as the 
court may order after notice to the other party and a hearing, unless there has been 
filed with the court a memorandum signed by both parties, wherein they agree to 
such disposition of the action. 
' MASS. R. DoM. REL. P. 58(c). This rule provides, in pertinent part: 
Nisi Judgment. At any time before the expiration of six months from the entry of a 
judgment of divorce nisi, the defendant, or any other person interested, may file ... 
a statement of objections to the judgment becoming absolute . . . . The judgment 
shall not become absolute until such objections have been disposed of by the court. 
If said petition to stay the judgment absolute is subsequently dismissed by the court, 
the judgment shall become absolute as of six months from the date of the judgment 
nisi. 
6 MAss. R. DoM. REL. P. 62(g). If the appeal is dismissed, the judgment becomes absolute 
six months from the date of the judgment nisi. /d. Thus, the term "staying of the running 
of the nisi period," as used in this article, means only that while such a stay is in effect, a 
judgment absolute will not be entered. It does not mean that the calculation of the nisi 
period is tolled. 
7 11 Mass. App. Ct. 1023, 420 N.E.2d 5 (1981). 
8 /d. at 1025, 420 N.E.2d at 7. 
9 See id. at 1024, 420 N.E.2d at 6. 
10 See id. at 1025, 420 N.E.2d at 7. The court's failure to rule sooner on the objections 
apparently resulted from the wife's discovery efforts and her amendment of her objections. 
See id. at 1024-25, 420 N.E.2d at 6-7. 
11 See id. at 1025, 420 N.E.2d at 7. 
12 See id. The court stated that the appellant's only alternatives were either to seek relief 
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The Giner court, in dicta, also indicated that the running of the nisi 
period is stayed by an appeal only if the appeal is taken from the entry 
of the judgment nisi, implying that the nisi period would not be stayed 
by an appeal from a dismissal of a rule 58( c) objection. 13 Application of 
this dicta, together with the court's holding, would greatly limit a party's 
opportunity for preventing a judgment of divorce nisi from becoming 
absolute. If the running of the nisi period is not stayed by an apppeal of 
the dismissal of a rule 58( c) objection, and if the appeal is moot after the 
nisi period has run, regardless of when the objection was raised, then an 
appeal, to be successful, would have to be filed, heard, and decided 
within the six month period. 
During the Survey year, in Saltmarsh v. Saltmarsh, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Giner dicta. 14 Without expressing an 
opinion on the Giner result, the Court held that any appeal from the 
denial of rule 58(c) objections will stay the running of the nisi period if 
the appeal is filed during that period. 15 The Court did not address, how-
ever, the specific holding of Giner, that is, whether an appeal of the 
dismissal of a rule 58(c) objection, raised within the nisi period but 
disposed of after the period had run, would be moot because the judgment 
had become absolute upon dismissal of the objection by the trial court. 16 
In Saltmarsh, the wife and husband had executed a separation agree-
ment, sworn an affidavit that there was an irretrievable breakdown of 
the marriage, and received a "1A order" for a "no-fault" divorce under 
chapter 208, section 1A. 17 Before the judgment nisi was to be entered, 
the wife claimed that she had learned that her husband had used mis-
leading statements to persuade her to agree to the separation agreement 
and the no-fault divorce. 18 The wife tried several avenues of relief before 
under rule 60(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, or to initiate 
separate proceedings seeking reformation or a change in the separation agreement. /d. 
13 /d. The court stated in dicta that, "There was no appeal from the entry of the judgment 
of divorce nisi, so the running of the nisi period was not stayed under Mass. R. Dom. Rei. 
P. 62(g) (1975)." /d. 
14 395 Mass. 405, 480 N.E.2d 618 (1985). 
15 /d. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 622-23. 
16 In citing Giner, the Court merely referred to "whatever the rule may be as to an appeal 
from the dismissal of rule 58( c) objections entered after a judgment has become absolute 
... . "/d. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 622. 
11 /d. at 406, 480 N.E.2d at 620. See also supra note 2 for G.L. c. 208, § 1A. 
18 /d. at 409, 480 N.E.2d at 622. The wife claimed that the husband had misrepresented 
to her that he was impotent and had contemplated suicide. /d. at 412, 480 N.E.2d at 623. 
She also asserted that after the divorce order was entered, she learned from an alleged 
former paramour of the husband that the paramour had maintained a long-time relationship 
with, and received financial assistance from, the husband and that he had induced the wife 
to convey to him sole ownership in certain real estate because he was secretly planning a 
future divorce. ld. at 412, 480 N.E.2d at 623-24. 
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the judge who had entered the 1A order. Prior to the entry of the judgment 
nisi, she brought an equity action for recission of the separation agree-
ment alleging, among other things, that the husband had used fraud to 
induce her to agree to the separation agreement. 19 The judge dismissed 
the equity action, however, on the basis that she had an adequate remedy 
at law.20 The wife appealed the equity action. 21 
After the judgment nisi was entered, the wife filed objections under 
rule 58(c)22 to the judgment becoming absolute. 23 The husband filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim24 based on the requirement 
that, when claiming fraud, the circumstances of the fraud must be stated 
with particularity. 25 On March 15, 1984, the husband's motion to dismiss 
was granted. 26 The wife appealed the dismissal on March 26, 1984,27 The 
judgment absolute was to enter on April4, 1984.28 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, after agreeing with the 
lower court that the wife had an adequate remedy within the divorce 
proceedings,29 vacated the order dismissing the wife's rule 58(c) objec-
19 /d. at 407, 480 N.E.2d at 621. Her amended complaint sought an order declaring the 
agreement null and void. /d. She considered the equity action to be appropriate because 
the separation agreement was both to be incorporated into the divorce judgment and, by 
its terms, to stand as an independent contract between the husband and wife. /d. at 407-
408, 480 N.E.2d at 621. To return to the state of financial affairs existing before the 
execution of the agreement, the Court stated, it was necessary to attack these dual char-
acteristics, and it was unclear whether this could be achieved within the divorce proceed-
ings. /d. at 408, 480 N.E.2d at 621. 
20 /d. at 406, 480 N.E.2d at 620. 
21 /d. The wife also filed a motion under rule 60(b) ofthe Massachusetts Rules of Domestic 
Relations Procedure, seeking relief from the lA order. /d. She did not appeal the denial of 
that motion. /d. 
22 See supra note 4 for text of rule 58( c). 
23 395 Mass. at 406, 480 N.E.2d at 620. 
24 MAss. R. DoM. REL. P. 12(b)(6). 
25 395 Mass. at 411, 480 N.E.2d at 623. MASS. R. DoM. REL. P. 9(b) provides in pertinent 
part that, "[i]n all averments of fraud ... the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall 
be stated with particularity." 
26 395 Mass. at 409, 480 N.E.2d at 622. 
27 /d. The wife also appealed late from the judgment nisi and from a denial of her motion 
for a stay of the entry of the judgment absolute. /d. at 406-07, 480 N.E.2d at 620. The 
Court found it unnecessary to address these issues due to the relief granted in the wife's 
appeal of the dismissal of her 58(c) objections. /d. at 407, 480 N.E.2d at 621. 
2s /d. at 409, 480 N .E.2d at 622. 
29 /d. at 408, 480 N.E.2d at 621. The Court found that the wife could not only obtain 
relief from the effect of the separation agreement as part of the divorce order in which it 
was incorporated, but she could also obtain a judgment that the agreement was null and 
void as an independent contract between her husband and herself. /d. Chapter 208, section 
lA, the Court noted, specifically states that if the judge does not approve the agreement, 
it "shall become null and void and of no further effect between the parties." /d. (quoting 
G.L. c. 208 § lA). If the wife were successful with her challenge the judge would be 
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tions. 30 The Court first ruled that the appeal was not moot since the 
running of the nisi period is stayed by any appeal based on rule 58(c) 
objections filed within the period. 31 Although the Court noted that rule 
58( c) provides that a judgment nisi shall not become absolute until ob-
jections filed under that rule are disposed of, the Court did not consider 
whether "disposed of" included completion of the appeals process. 32 
Instead, the Court based its holding on rule 62(g),33 which states that the 
filing of an appeal will stay the running of the nisi period.34 Contrary to 
the Giner dicta, 35 the Court found that the applicability of rule 62(g) was 
not limited to appeals from judgments of divorce nisi. 36 The Court rea-
soned that the rule referred only to "[t]he filing of an appeal," and ruled, 
therefore, that any appeal from an independently based rule 58(c) objec-
tion will stay the running of the nisi period.37 Since the wife's appeal was 
filed before the expiration of the nisi period, the Court concluded, the 
running of the nisi period had been stayed, the nisi judgment was not yet 
absolute and, thus, the appeal was not moot. 38 
Finally, the Court determined that the probate judge had erred in 
required to disapprove the agreement. Id. at 408, 480 N.E.2d at 621. Therefore, the Court 
reasoned, if the agreement were disapproved, it would be null and void and of no further 
effect between the husband and the wife. I d. The probate judge, the Court concluded, thus 
had ruled correctly that the divorce proceedings offered the wife an adequate remedy. ld. 
The Court did not express an opinion as to what effect the disapproval would have on third 
parties who may have acquired rights due to actions taken pursuant to the agreement. Id. 
at 408 n.3, 480 N.E.2d at 621 n.3. 
30 Id. at 414, 480 N.E.2d at 624. 
31 Id. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 623. If the running of the nisi period had not been stayed, it 
would have become absolute on April 4, 1984. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying 
text. The appeal was filed on March 26, 1984, 395 Mass. at 409, 480 N.E.2d at 622, but not 
heard until March 5, 1985. Id. at 405, 480 N.E.2d at 618. The husband claimed, therefore, 
that the appeal of the dismissal of the rule 58( c) objections was moot because, when the 
Court heard the appeal, the nisi period had run. ld. at 409, 480 N.E.2d at 622. 
32 See id. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 622. The Court only noted that rule 58(c) did not address 
the effect an appeal from the dismissal of rule 58( c) objections would have on the entry of 
a judgment absolute. I d. 
33 Id. 
34 MAss. R. DoM. REL. P. 62(g) provides in pertinent part that, "[t]he filing of an appeal 
shall stay the running of the nisi period as provided by Rule 58( c)." 
3s See supra note 13. 
36 395 Mass. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 622 (quoting MASS. R. DoM. REL. P. 62(g)). 
37 Id. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 623. 
38 ld. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 622-23. The Court also suggested that "fairness" required 
this holding since, when the probate judge heard the husband's motion to dismiss the wife's 
58(c) objections, the husband's counsel had conceded that the wife would have a right of 
appeal if the husband's motion was granted before the nisi judgment became absolute. I d. 
at 411, 480 N.E.2d at 623. The Court reasoned that the judge may well have relied on these 
representations of the husband's counsel in dismissing the wife's objections while denying 
her motion to stay the judgment from becoming absolute. I d. 
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dismissing the wife's rule 58( c) objections without an evidentiary hearing 
and based only on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 39 The 
Court held that the wife's allegations were stated with sufficient partic-
ularity.40 Even if the fraud allegations were deficient, the Court continued, 
the wife would have been allowed to amend her pleading.41 The Court 
further found that the wife's allegations, if proven, were sufficiently 
serious to warrant the withdrawal of approval of the separation agree-
ment, and consequently, dismissal of the divorce action.42 
The Saltmarsh case is significant primarily for its holding that any 
appeal taken within the nisi period from the denial of a rule 58( c) objection 
will prevent a judgment nisi from becoming absolute until the disposition 
of the appeal.43 This holding clarifies the restrictive, and perhaps inad-
vertent, language of Giner v. Giner« which suggested that the only type 
of appeal which would stay the running of the nisi period was an appeal 
from the entry of judgment of divorce nisi. 45 The Saltmarsh holding 
assures that a party who files a timely appeal from dismissal of objections 
to a judgment of divorce nisi becoming absolute will not have the appeal 
rendered moot simply because the appeals court did not act on the appeal 
prior to the scheduled expiration date of the nisi period. 
The Saltmarsh decision, however, left open a more troublesome issue 
specifically addressed by Giner and it is questionable whether both hold-
ings can rationally or constitutionally coexist. Under Giner, a dismissal 
of rule 58(c) objections which were seasonably filed within the nisi period 
yet not disposed of by the trial court within the scheduled close of that 
period cannot be appealed.46 Under Saltmarsh, on the other hand, if the 
trial court dimissed those same objections within the nisi period, so that 
it is possible to file an appeal before the close of the period, then the 
appeal will be heardY As a result, the opportunity for appeal from a 
dismissal of a rule 58( c) objection may be denied due to events, such as 
the other party's delaying tactics or an overloaded appeals court docket, 
over which a party may have no control. 
Conditioning access to the appeals courts on such fortuitous circum-
stances may be inconsistent with the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.48 In an analogous situation, the United States 
39 Id. at 411-13, 480 N.E.2d at 623-24. 
40 Id. at 411, 480 N.E.2d at 623. 
41 Id. at 412, 480 N.E.2d at 623. 
42 Id. at 413, 480 N.E.2d at 624. 
43 See id. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 623. 
44 11 Mass. App. Ct. 1023, 420 N.E.2d 5 (1981). 
"Id. at 1025, 420 N.E.2d at 7. 
46 See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Giner. 
47 See 395 Mass. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 623. 
48 The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part: 
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Supreme Court, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. ,49 unanimously 
rejected50 a state court interpretation of a state statute which would have 
conditioned a complainant's remedy on the timeliness of state action over 
which the complainant had no controi.51 In this case, the appellant had 
filed a complaint with the Illinois Fair Employment Commission alleging 
that, under state statute, he had been unlawfully discharged by his em-
ployer because of the appellant's physical handicap. 52 The statute re-
quired that the Commission conduct a factfinding conference within 120 
days of the filing of the complaint. 53 The Commission, however, did not 
schedule the conference until five days after the expiration of the statu-
tory period.54 The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the failure of the 
Commission to convene the conference within the statutorily mandated 
period had deprived the Commission of the jurisdiction to hear the com-
plaint. 55 The majority ofthe United States Supreme Court, without reach-
ing the equal protection issue, rejected the Illinois court's holding on the 
basis that it failed to provide due process to the appellant. 56 
Four justices, however, in a concurring opinion written by Justice 
Blackmun, did specifically address the equal protection claim.57 Justice 
Blackmun noted that the statute as interpreted by the Illinois court di-
vided claimaints into two discrete groups: those whose claims are pro-
cessed within 120 days and who receive "the opportunity for full ... 
judicial review," and those with identical claims who receive no judicial 
process simply because the claims were not processed within the statu-
tory period. 58 This had the effect, Justice Blackmun stated, of drawing 
an arbitrary line between otherwise identical claims and, by state action, 
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV§ l. 
49 455 u.s. 422 (1982). 
50 /d. at 423. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not join in the opinion of the Court but 
concurred in the judgment. /d. at 443. 
51 See id. at 426-28. 
52 !d. at 426. 
53 /d. 
54 /d. 
55 /d. at 427. 
56 See id. at 428-38. The Court held that the state, through established procedure and 
without giving the appellant a meaningful opportunity to be heard, had improperly destroyed 
the complainant's entitlement to state created adjudicatory procedures. /d. Under the 
circumstances of the case, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required 
that the state provide the appellant a hearing prior to the withdrawal of that right. /d. at 
436-37. 
57 See id. at 438-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. !d. at 438 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
58 /d. at 438-39 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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converting similarly situated claims into dissimilarly situated ones. 59 Such 
a classification, Justice Blacknmn found, did not satisfy the requirement 
of the equal protection clause that there be a rational basis between the 
classification and a legitimate state goal. 60 
As a result of the decisions in Giner and Saltmarsh, current no-fault 
divorce law classifies appellants of dismissals of rule 58( c) objections in 
a manner rejected by Logan. A party's access to judicial review of a 
dismissal of a rule 58( c) objection is determined by how expeditiously its 
objection is disposed of. Two classes are arbitrarily established: those 
who can file an appeal because their objections are dismissed within six 
months of the entry of a judgment nisi, and those who are denied "the 
opportunity for full judicial review" because their objections are not 
dismissed in time to file an appeal. As in Logan, there is no discernible 
rational basis for such a classification. 
The legislature could solve this problem by amending rule 58(c). 61 The 
rule could be clarified by amending the penultimate sentence to read: 
"The judgment shall not become absolute until such objections have been 
disposed of by the court, including appeals of the court's decision re-
garding such objections." The amendment would make clear that a par-
ty's right to appeal the dismissal of a rule 58(c) objection, raised within 
the nisi period, is not lost merely by the fact that the objection was 
dismissed more than six months after the entry of a judgment of divorce 
nisi. 
Alternatively, the judiciary could provide the needed clarification 
through statutory interpretation. A court could first note that since a 
serious question of constitutionality is presented, it must first determine 
whether there is a fair construction of the rules which would avoid the 
constitutional question. 63 The court could point out that the running of 
the nisi period is stayed by either a timely objection raised pursuant to 
rule 58(c), or filing an appeal under rule 62(g), which explicitly refers to 
rule 58(c).64 Therefore, the court could reason, if both the raising of the 
objection and appealing its dismissal will stay the running of the nisi 
period, the legislature could not have intended that the judgment would 
become absolute after the objection was dismissed and before the appeal 
59 /d. at 442 (Biackmun, J., concurring). 
60 /d. (Biackmun, J., concurring). Additionally, Justices Powell and Rehnquist, in a 
separate concurring opinion and without discussing the equal protection clause, agreed that 
the Commission's classification lacked rational basis./d. at 443-44 (Powell, J., concurring). 
6
' See supra note 5. 
63 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979); International 
Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961). See also Murray v. The 
Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804). 
64 See supra note 34. 
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could possibly be raised. The most logical conclusion would be that the 
term "disposed of by the court" in rule 58(c) means that all avenues of 
judicial recourse regarding the objection have been closed. 
This treatment of rule 58( c) obviously will result in delaying the entry 
of a judgment absolute in some cases. The harmful consequences, how-
ever, will be limited by rule 62(g) which provides that the filing of an 
appeal shall not affect the operation of other court orders regarding 
custody, visitation, alimony, support, or maintenance.65 In light of the 
significant property rights involved in a marriage and the importance of 
that institution to our social structure, the proposed interpretation of rule 
58(c) is most desirable in assuring that any objections to a final marriage 
dissolution will be thoroughly evaluated. 
As a result of Saltmarsh, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
has clarified rule 62(g) of the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations 
Procedure in holding that any appeal of the disposition of a rule 58(c) 
objection will be heard if filed before the expiration of the nisi period. 
The question remains whether such an appeal will be heard if the rule 
58(c) objection is dismissed too late to file the appeal before the nisi 
period has run. Due to considerations of fairness and constitutionality, 
this issue needs to be addressed by either the state legislature or the 
judiciary. 
§ 4.5. Paternity Suits by Unmarried Fathers.* For over 100 years, the 
Massachusetts courts have held that a child born while a couple is married 
is presumed to be the child of the husband. 1 This presumption of legiti-
macy applies even if a child is born after a divorce decree is entered but 
before the decree becomes final. 2 This presumption can be rebutted only 
by proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the husband could not have 
been the father. 3 
65 MAss. R. DoM. REL. P. 62(g). 
*Mark Katzoff, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.5. 1 Phillips v. Allen, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 453, 454 (1861) (suit regarding paternity to 
establish right to inherit). 
2 Koffman v. Koffman, 193 Mass. 593, 596, 79 N.E. 780, 780 (1907). The initial divorce 
decree is called a decree nisi. G.L. c. 208, § 21. The divorce does not become final until 
six months after the issuance of the nisi decree. /d. 
3 G.L. c. 208, § 21. The accepted means of proof are that the husband was not physically 
present to have sex with his wife during the probable time of conception, that the husband 
was impotent during the period of conception, or a blood test. Commonwealth v. Leary, 
345 Mass. 59, 60, 185 N.E.2d 641, 642 (1962) (criminal case where defendant was charged 
with fathering the child out of wedlock). Testimony by the mother as to her husband's 
absence during the period of conception is sufficient proof that the husband could not have 
been the father. ld. at 61, 185 N.E.2d at 642. 
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Either the mother4 of the child or the husband, known as the presumed 
father, 5 may challenge this presumption. In the case of illegitimate chil-
dren, Massachusetts courts have held that both the mother6 and an 
individual claiming to be the natural father7 can bring suit to establish 
the paternity of the child. However, prior to the Survey year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court had not determined whether an individual, not the hus-
band, claiming to be the natural father of a legitimate child could bring 
suit to challenge the presumption of legitimacy.8 
During the Survey year, in P.B.C. v. D.H.,9 the Supreme Judicial Court 
extended the legal presumption of legitimacy beyond the previous border 
of divorce nisi and held that a child conceived during marriage, but born 
after a final divorce decree, is presumed to be the child of the husband. 10 
The Court therefore concluded that an individual who was not the hus-
band at the time of conception has no standing to bring a suit to establish 
his paternity of the child.'' If extended beyond the facts of this case, the 
holding in PBC could preclude all natural fathers of children who are 
presumed to be legitimate from ever establishing their paternity of the 
children. 
The plaintiff, PBC, was a man who had a long sexual relationship with 
the defendant, DH, prior to September 1981, which was the approximate 
date of conception. 12 DH was married to another man during her rela-
tionship with PBC. 13 DH filed for divorce from her husband in May 1981, 
and the divorce was granted in December of the same year. 14 The divorce 
became final in June 1982, and the child was born one day laterY The 
birth certificate listed DH's husband as the father, and he never denied 
his paternity. 16 The alleged father of the child, PBC, had occasionally 
visited the child until DH began to prevent PBC's visits beginning in 
September 1983, leading PBC to file suit to establish his paternity of the 
4 Symonds v. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, 544, 432 N.E.2d 700, 703 (1982) (divorce case 
where husband denied paternity of his wife's child). 
s /d. 
6 Baby X v. Misiano, 373 Mass. 265, 265, 366 N.E.2d 755, 756 (1977) (suit by mother for 
support of the fetus and of the child after the fetus is born). 
7 Normand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 853, 434 N.E.2d 631, 633 (1982) (suit by man 
claiming to be natural father to establish visitation rights). 
8 P.B.C. v. D.H., 396 Mass. 68, 71, 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. 
Ct. 1286 (1986). 
9 396 Mass. 68, 483 N.E.2d 1094 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1286 (1986). 
10 /d. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096 (emphasis in original). 
11 Id. at 68, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
12 /d. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. 
IS Jd. 
16 /d. 
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child. 17 Six days after PBC filed his suit, DH remarried her former hus-
band who was the presumed father of her child, and she, her husband 
and the child lived together continuously through the time of the trial. 18 
PBC brought suit in the probate and family court to be declared the 
natural father of the child and to be granted custody of the child or 
visitation rights. 19 PBC then moved that the court order the parties and 
the child to submit to blood tests to determine his paternity. 20 The trial 
court eventually granted PBC's request, but DH refused to submit to the 
test.21 The court sanctioned DH by deeming her to have made conces-
sions favorable to PBC. 22 DH responded by moving to dismiss the suit 
on the grounds that PBC lacked standing to challenge paternity.23 The 
trial judge denied the motion to dismiss and again ordered DH to submit 
to the blood test. 24 The order provided for extreme sanctions if DH did 
not comply.25 
DH then filed an appeal to the Appeals Court on the denial of her 
motion to dismiss. 26 A single justice of the Appeals Court authorized the 
appeal and granted a stay of proceedings in the trial court. 27 The Supreme 
Judicial Court then transferred the case on its own initiative. 28 The Court 
chose to treat the case as a motion for summary judgment, considering 
only the facts discussed in the pleadings and other documents of the 
parties that were undisputed. 29 The Court held that PBC lacked standing 
to adjudicate the issue of paternity and remanded the case to the probate 
court for dismissal. 30 
Before determining whether PBC had the right to bring an action to 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 70-71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. It is also unclear how often DH lived with her ex-
husband between the conception of the child and their remarriage, but the Court stated 
that was irrelevant. Id. at 70 n.1, 483 N.E.2d at 1096 n.l. 
19 Id. at 69, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
20 Id. The test to be used was a Human Leukocyte Antigen white blood cell test. Id. 
21 ld. 
22 Id. The Court did not specify what the concessions were. ld. 
z3 Id. 
24 ld. 
25 Id. The possible sanctions included precluding DH from introducing evidence on 
paternity at trial, imprisonment until DH complied, and imposing daily costs on DH until 
she complied. Id. 
26 ld. 
27 I d. at 69-70, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. The Appeals Court justice granted the stay because 
he feared that if the blood test proved that PBC was the child's natural father and the court 
subsequently ruled that PBC lacked standing to adjudicate the issue of paternity, the child 
could be unnecessarily emotionally harmed. /d. at 69, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
28 ld. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. This was done pursuant to G.L. c. 2llA, § 12 (Supp. 
1985). 
29 Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
30 ld. at 68, 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1095-96. 
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determine paternity, the Court examined the issue of the legal presump-
tion of the child's paternity. 31 The established presumption, the Court 
noted, is that a child born during a marriage is presumed to be the child 
of the husband. 32 The Court stated that this presumption could be rebut-
ted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumed father could 
not be the father of the child. 33 The Court then extended the presumption 
of legitimacy, holding that if a child is conceived during a marriage, the 
husband is the presumed father of the child, subject to the same test for 
rebutting the presumption as was previously established. 34 The Court 
stated that extending the presumption of legitimacy to children conceived 
during marriage was consistent with the Court's established policy of 
affording legitimacy to children whenever possible. 35 The Court then 
concluded that because the child in question was conceived during the 
marriage, DH's once and current husband was presumed to be the fa-
ther. 36 
The Court then turned to PBC's claim that he had a right to rebut that 
presumptionY The Court noted that it previously never had considered 
the issue whether a man claiming to be the natural father of a presumed 
legitimate child could rebut the presumption of the child's paternity.38 
The Court held that such a man had no constitutional right to adjudicate 
the issue of paternity39 and that public policy did not justify granting PBC 
a common law right to determine paternity. 40 
Looking to the United States Supreme Court decision of Stanley v. 
Illinois, 41 the Court first examined whether PBC had a due process right 
to a hearing on the paternity issue under the fourteenth amendment of 
the United States Constitution.42 Stanley involved a man who had raised 
his illegitimate children jointly with their mother for nearly eighteen 
years.43 Upon the mother's death, the children were declared wards of 
the state and were placed with court-appointed guardians.44 Stanley 
31 /d. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
32 /d. (citing Phillips, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) at 454) (emphasis in original). 
33 ld. 
34 Id. (emphasis in original). 
35 ld. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. In Normand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 434 N.E.2d 631 (1982), the Court held that 
a man claiming to be the natural father of an illegitimate child could seek an adjudication 
of his paternity. ld. at 853, 434 N .E.2d at 633 (emphasis added). 
39 PBC, 396 Mass. at 71-72, 483 N .E.2d at 1097. 
40 ld. at 72, 483 N .E.2d at 1097. 
41 405 u.s. 645 (1972). 
42 PBC, 396 Mass. at 72, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
43 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. 
44 ld. 
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claimed that the taking of the children violated his due process rights to 
a hearing on his fitness as a parent. 45 Stanley further claimed that the 
taking violated his equal protection rights because married fathers and 
unmarried mothers were entitled to a hearing on their fitness as parents 
while unmarried fathers were denied such a hearing.46 The United States 
Supreme Court held that unmarried fathers did have an interest in their 
children that warranted due process protection absent a "powerful coun-
tervailing interest" on the part of the state.47 The Court found that Illinois 
did not have an interest in denying Stanley a hearing because if he was 
a fit parent, the children would not be protected by taking them from 
Stanley.48 
The Supreme Judicial Court found Stanley distinguishable from the 
facts of PBC on three grounds.49 First, the Court stated, Stanley involved 
illegitimate children, not a child presumed legitimate. 50 Second, the Court 
noted, Stanley involved the presumed unfitness of unmarried fathers as 
parents, not a presumption of paternity as Stanley was the acknowledged 
father of the children involvedY Finally, the Court declared, in Stanley 
the plaintiff father had raised the children for nearly eighteen years, 
whereas PBC only occasionally visited the child. 52 The Court then con-
ceded that despite the distinguishable characteristics of Stanley, the 
Court recognized in general that an unwed natural father had a legally 
protectable interest in his children. 53 The Court concluded, however, that 
the circumstances in PBC did not justify extending protection to PBC 
because the state had a powerful countervailing interest in protecting the 
family. 54 
The Court then elaborated on its conclusion that PBC had no due 
process right to establish paternity by examining the appropriate standard 
for determining whether PBC's due process rights had been violated. 55 
The Court remarked that the only requirement of due process is that the 
means used "have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to 
be obtained."56 The State's objective here, the Court explained, was 
protecting a "legitimate and strong" interest in strengthening family life 
45 /d. 
46 /d. 
47 /d. at 651. 
48 /d. at 652-53. 
49 PBC, 396 Mass. at 72, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
50 /d. 
5I /d. 
52 /d. 
53 /d. 
54 /d. 
55 /d. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
56 /d. (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)). 
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and in affording legitimacy to children.57 In the situation before it, the 
Court noted that the presumed father never denied paternity and was 
living with mother and child as part of a family unit. 58 Therefore, the 
Court concluded, denying PBC the right to adjudicate paternity advanced 
the State's interests by protecting that family unit, and did not violate 
PBC's due process rights.59 
The Court then turned to PBC's claims under the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause and under article 106 of the Amendments 
to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the Massachusetts Equal 
Rights Amendment (ERA). 60 The Court concluded that the Massachusetts 
ERA did not apply to this case because there was no gender-based 
classification involved in denying natural fathers the right to pursue their 
claims in court. 61 Presumed fathers, as well as mothers, the Court stated, 
could bring actions to determine a child's paternity.62 
The Court then examined the more general requirement of equal pro-
tection, that all persons in similar circumstances be treated alike.63 The 
Court stated that PBC was not in the same situation as the mother or 
presumed father because he was not part of the family unit. 64 This dis-
tinction was justified, the Court reasoned, because a suit brought by an 
outsider to establish paternity would be more likely to disrupt the family 
unit, which the Commonwealth seeks to protect, than if a family member 
brought the action. 65 The Court elaborated that a suit brought by an 
outsider would be more disruptive for two reasons.66 First, the Court 
stated, if a family member brought the suit, the family probably had been 
disrupted already. 67 Second, the Court explained, a member of the family 
would be better able to gauge the impact of a paternity suit on the family 
S1 /d. 
S8Jd. 
59 /d. The Court also noted that unlike Stanley, the state here had a powerful interest in 
strengthening the family that justified withholding due process protection of the natural 
father's interest in his children. /d. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097-98. 
00 /d. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. The Court noted that the Massachusetts ERA required 
a higher standard of review than that required by the fourteenth amendment. /d. at 74, 483 
N.E.2d at 1098. The ERA standard of strict scrutiny, the Court stated, requires that there 
be a compelling state interest served by a minimally intrusive statute. /d. By contrast, the 
Court explained, the fourteenth amendment requires only that a statute be substantially 
related to an important governmental interest. /d. 
61Jd. 
62 /d. (citing Symonds, 385 Mass. at 544, 432 N.E.2d at 703) (emphasis added). 
63 /d. (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769,779-80, 126 N.E.2d 795, 801 (1955)). 
64Jd. 
63 /d. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
66 /d. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
67 /d. 
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than an outsider could. 68 Therefore, the Court concluded, PBC had no 
right under equal protection to bring a paternity action. 69 
Finally, the Court briefly addressed the possibility of establishing a 
common law right for PBC to bring his action. 70 The Court concluded 
that allowing alleged natural fathers to bring an action to establish pa-
ternity of children conceived while the mother was married to another 
man would be contrary to the social policies of strengthening the family 
unit and affording legitimacy to children where possible. 71 The Court 
expressly declined to offer an opinion on whether the child could later 
bring an action to establish PBC as the father. 72 The Court then remanded 
the case to the probate court for dismissal.73 
The PBC decision changes the law in Massachusetts in two ways. 
First, prior to PBC, a child conceived during a marriage was only pre-
sumed to be the child of the husband if the child was born between the 
nisi decree and the time the divorce became final. 74 As a result of PBC, 
all children conceived during a marriage are presumed to be the child of 
the husband regardless of when they are born.75 Secondly, prior to PBC, 
the Court had only decided that a man could sue to establish paternity 
of an illegitimate child.76 Under PBC, the Court has established that a 
man who is not the putative father of a child conceived by a married 
woman does not have the right to bring a court action to establish the 
paternity of a child who is presumed to be legitimate.77 The courts of 
California/8 Delaware79 and Wyoming80 have reached the same result 
regarding an alleged natural father's right to sue for paternity. On the 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1099. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. Where the putative parents attack a child's legitimacy in an adultery action, the 
findings of the court regarding a child's paternity are not binding on the child. Sayles v. 
Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 69, 80 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1948). However, if the proof of the child's 
illegitmacy is established by a blood test, the child's ability to sue to establish the putative 
father as the child's real father may be essentially worthless. Symonds, 385 Mass. at 545 
n.7, 432 N.E.2d at 703 n.7. 
73 Symonds, 385 Mass. at 545 n.7, 432 N.E.2d at 703 n.7. 
74 Koffman v. Koffman, 193 Mass. 593, 596, 79 N.E. 780, 780 (1907). 
75 PBC, 396 Mass. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
76 Normand v. Barke, 385 Mass. 851, 853, 434 N.E.2d 631, 633 (1982). 
77 PBC, 396 Mass. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99. 
78 Vincent B. v. John R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 625-27, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 11-13 (1981) 
(child born during marriage and parents subsequently divorced four years later). 
79 Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075, 1078-80 (Del. 1981) (child born during 
marriage and parents still married). 
80 A. v. X., Y., and Z., 641 P.2d 1222, 1224-27 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982) 
(mother married six months before child was born with her husband presumed to be the 
father; presumed parents still married). 
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other hand, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that alleged natural 
fathers do have the right to sue. 81 
It is possible that the holding that an alleged natural father does not 
have standing to sue for paternity may be limited to the facts of this case, 
where the mother remarried her ex-husband who was the putative father 
and lived with him and the child as a "family unit. "82 This holding should 
be limited to the facts in this case because it could prevent many natural 
fathers from establishing paternity of their children, especially when 
coupled with the extension of the presumption of legitimacy. The exten-
sion of the presumption of legitimacy to all pregnancies which begin 
during marriage is by itself acceptable and is consistent with the estab-
lished policy of affording legitimacy to children whenever possible. 83 It 
is important to note, however, that the extension of the presumption 
together with the Court's holding that alleged natural fathers lack standing 
to sue for paternity of children presumed to be legitimate sharply limits 
a natural father's ability to establish paternity of his own children. Alleged 
natural fathers should be allowed to establish paternity of their children 
unless it would clearly conflict with state policy, as in the present case 
where the child was living with the mother and the presumed father as a 
family. 
The Court discusses two state interests, protecting the family84 and 
affording legitimacy to children whenever possible,85 to justify its deci-
sion. In order for the Court's denial of standing to alleged natural fathers 
for paternity suits to pass muster under due process, however, the denial 
81 R. MeG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 352-53, 615 P.2d 666, 671-72 (1980) (mother had 
conceded that the alleged natural father was the father of the child). 
82 PBC, 396 Mass. at 73-74,483 N.E.2d at 1097-98. The Court makes continual references 
to the ~;xistence of a family unit in this case. /d. Of the three state cases in accord with 
the Court's holding, only one case, Vincent B., involves a divorced couple. 126 Cal. App. 
3d at 622, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 10. The couple in Vincent B. remained separated, but the child 
had lived in a family unit with the mother and the presumed father for four years. /d. at 
626-27, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 12-13. The court concluded that granting the alleged natural father 
visitation rights in that situation could be confusing to the child. /d. at 628, 179 Cal. Rptr. 
at 13. The problem of confusion could be solved in two ways. Standing to sue could be 
granted only when the child was born after a divorce and had never lived together with 
both parents as a family unit, or a guardian ad litem could be appointed for the child to 
help determine whether visitation is in the child's best interests. SeeR. MeG., 200 Colo. 
at 353, 615 P.2d at 672. In that case, the guardian ad litem concluded that the paternity suit 
was in the child's best interests. /d. 
sJ See Powers v. Steele, 394 Mass. 306, 310-11, 475 N.E.2d 395, 397-98 (1985); Green 
v. Kelley, 228 Mass. 602, 605, 118 N.E. 235, 237 (1917) (Massachusetts public policy not 
frustrated by the use of other states' less strict legitimacy laws to determine the right to 
inherit Massachusetts trusts and estates). 
84 PBC, 396 Mass. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
85Jd. 
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must serve only one "powerful countervailing interest."86 The Court's 
analysis of PBC's due process claim is relatively brief and focuses more 
on distinguishing PBC's situation from Stanley than on the impact of 
granting standing on the state's interests.87 Under the facts of PBC, 
however, it is indisputable that both state interests are served by denying 
alleged natural fathers standing. Therefore, under the due process clause, 
the Court can deny standing to alleged natural fathers. 
The interest in affording legitimacy to children is served in all circum-
stances by denying alleged natural fathers standing to sue. By limiting 
the parties who can challenge a child's legitimacy to the child's presumed 
parents, it becomes more difficult for a suit challenging legitimacy to be 
brought. 88 Since the concern here is limiting the parties who may sue, 
and not with a "family unit," it does not matter whether the presumed 
parents are still married to each other. This analysis thus applies to all 
circumstances where alleged natural fathers seek standing to sue. 
The state's interest in preserving the family, however, is only served 
as long as there is a family to protect. The Court's analysis of PBC's due 
process interest emphasizes the fact that there was a family unit formed 
by DH, the child and the presumed father which should not be considered 
less of a unit because they were temporarily separated by a divorce. 89 
However, if a family unit were dissolved by a divorce and did not reunite, 
there would be no family unit to protect, and the state's interest in 
protecting the family would not be served by denying alleged natural 
fathers standing to sue for paternity when the family had dissolved. 90 
Since the state's interest in promoting legitimacy is served by denial of 
standing to alleged fathers, however, alleged natural fathers should have 
no due process right to sue for paternity under any circumstances. 
Under equal protection, the issue is not whether a state interest is 
served but whether "all persons in the same catagories and in the same 
circumstances" must be treated alike. 91 The Court's analysis of the equal 
86 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. The state interest asserted in Stanley was protecting the 
welfare of the children by removing them from unfit parents. I d. at 652. 
87 PBC, 3% Mass. at 72-73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097-98. 
88 See id. If either of the presumed parents challenges the child's legitimacy, the stigma 
of illegitimacy may attach regardless of the legal conclusions because the presumed parents 
are the ones who should be the most familiar with the child's paternity. 
Aside from the social stigma of illegitimacy, there are also legal consequences. In order 
for an illegitimate child to inherit from his or her natural father, the natural father must 
have either acknowledged his paternity orally or in writing or have had a court determine 
his paternity. Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 669-70, 405 N.E.2d 135, 141 (1980). 
There is also a presumption that any reference to "issue" in a will includes only legitimate 
children. Powers, 394 Mass. at 309, 475 N.E.2d at 397 (1985). 
89 PBC, 396 Mass. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
90 Contra Vincent B., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 626, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 12. 
91 Opinion of the Justices, 322 Mass. 769, 779-80, 128 N .E.2d 795, 801 (1955). 
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protection issue is limited to discussing the different statuses of PBC and 
ofDH and the presumed father in light ofthe state's interest in preserving 
the family. 92 The Court does not consider how classifying PBC differently 
from the presumed parents impacts on the state's interest in affording 
legitimacy to children, but the analysis is similar to that regarding the 
state's interest in preserving the family. Using the equal protection anal-
ysis, the Court is justified in treating PBC differently under the facts of 
this case where DH and the presumed father form a family unit, and 
PBC is an "outsider" relative to the family unit. 93 Once the family unit 
is dissolved, however, there is no practical distinction between "insiders" 
and "outsiders," since the distinction is drawn to protect the family. 94 
The insider/outsider distinction makes no sense at all when considering 
the state's interest in protecting the legitimacy of children. 
One of the Court's concerns in denying PBC standing to inititate a 
paternity suit is that such a suit "has the likely effect of seriously dis-
rupting an intact marriage and family .... "95 The Court distinguished 
between those within the family and those outside the family based on 
this concern. The Court noted that family "insiders" would be better able 
to determine the impact of a paternity suit on the family than an outsider 
could. 96 The Court also stated that if a family member did bring a pa-
ternity suit, the family unit probably has already been harmed beyond 
repair. 97 The logical extension of this latter line of reasoning is that if the 
family is already disrupted, there is no longer a need to protect it. 
Therefore, if there is no longer a family unit and the mother is living 
alone with her child, there is no need to protect the family by denying 
"outsiders" the right to bring paternity suits because there is no longer a 
familY. to protect. Furthermore, if there is no longer a family, there are 
92 PBC, 396 Mass. at 74, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
93 It is not clear what the Court considers as constituting a family unit, merely living 
together or having the mother and father married as well. See id. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 
1098. 
Moreover, the Court correctly dismissed PBC's claims of a gender-based distinction in 
the rules governing who may establish paternity. ld. at 74, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. Any 
advantage that the mother has over a third party claiming to be the natural father in 
determining paternity suits comes from the fact that she is a member of the family unit. 
Id. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. Women as a class differ from men because they do not 
have to prove maternity by the nature of biology. See Lowell 380 Mass. at 668, 405 N .E.2d 
at 140 (holding that the Commonwealth could establish different standards for a child to 
establish illegitimate paternity and illegitimate maternity for inheritance purposes because 
it is easier to establish maternity). See also X., Y., and Z., 641 P.2d at 1225. 
94 PBC, 396 Mass. at 74, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
9s Id. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
96 Id. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
97 ld. 
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no insiders or outsiders, just presumed parents and alleged natural par-
ents. 
Where there still is a family, as in PBC, the distinction between insiders 
and outsiders is warranted. Someone who is not a part of the family is 
presumably not as familiar with the family as someone who is a family 
member. This presumption is far different from the presumption made 
by Illinois and struck down by the Supreme Court in Stanley that illegit-
imate fathers in the same circumstances as illegitimate mothers would 
always be unfit parents. 98 The Court's argument that family members 
would be better able to gauge the impact of paternity suits and therefore 
minimize the harm to the family thus justifies denying alleged natural 
fathers the right to standing for paternity suits where the child is part of 
a family unit with his or her presumed parents. However, if there is no 
family, there should be no distinction between the presumed parents and 
the alleged natural father. 
The Court· does not discuss equal protection in relation to the state's 
interest in affording legitimacy to children whenever possible,99 but the 
legitimacy interest does not justify extending PBC beyond the facts of 
the case. In distinguishing between family members and outsiders for the 
protection of the family, the Court stated that if a family member brought 
a paternity suit, there would either be no family left to protect, or the 
family member would be able to judge the impact of the suit and would 
bring the suit only if it did not harm the family. 100 The first part of this 
concern may apply to legitimacy; if a parent challenges the legitimacy of 
the child there will be a severe impact. 101 However, there is no indication 
that a putative parent would be less likely to bring a paternity suit than 
an outsider. A putative father may be more inclined than an outsider to 
bring a paternity action because proving that he is not the father could 
relieve him of support obligations. 102 On the other hand, if someone 
establishes himself as the child's father, that individual may be required 
to pay support. 103 More than monetary concerns are involved, of course, 
but on the whole it does not appear that alleged natural fathers would be 
more or less likely than putative fathers to bring paternity actions. In 
that instance, there is no reason to distinguish between the two groups 
for equal protection purposes. 104 
98 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. 
99 See PBC, 396 Mass. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
100 Id. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
101 See id. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
102 See Symonds, 385 Mass. at 544, 432 N.E.2d at 703. "A married man should have no 
duty to support a child born to his wife during their marriage but fathered by another man 
0 0 0 ,"/d. 
103 See Normand, 385 Mass. at 853, 434 N.E.2d at 633. 
104 SeeR. MeG., 200 Colo. at 351, 615 P.2d at 670-71. There may be a different result if 
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PBC establishes one clear change in Massachusetts law by extending 
the presumption of legitimacy to all children conceived during a marriage. 
The case also establishes that under some circumstances, at least, a man 
who fathers a child by a woman who was married to another man at the 
time of conception does not have a right to adjudicate the child's patern-
ity. However, there are indications that this holding may be limited to 
the facts of PBC where the mother remarried her ex-husband and lived 
with her husband and the child as a family after the divorce. It is possible 
that under different circumstances a third party may be able to pursue 
his claim of being the natural father in court. For the moment, however, 
alleged natural fathers do not have the right to establish paternity unless 
the child is clearly illegitimate. 
§ 4.6. Judicial Discretion to Award Alimony and to Divide Property in 
Divorce Actions.* Section 34 of chapter 208 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws authorizes probate and superior courts to award alimony and to 
order the division of property in divorce actions. 1 A court may award 
alimony to the husband or wife, and, in addition to or in lieu of alimony, 
may assign to either party all or part of the other's estate. 2 Section 34 
lists factors that a court "shall consider" as well as factors that a court 
"may consider" when determining the amount of alimony to be awarded 
or the nature and value of the property to be assigned. 3 The factors a 
court shall consider include "the length of the marriage, the conduct of 
the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, 
amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, 
liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each 
for future acquisition of capital assets and income. "4 As one court has 
noted, these mandatory criteria are traditional alimony considerations.5 
The factors a court may consider include each party's contribution to 
the child was born during a marriage and lived with both parents for some time before the 
divorce. See Vincent B., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 626, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 12. See also Quilloin 
v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978) (holding that it is consti-
tutional to distinguish between divorced father and alleged natural father on equal protection 
grounds because the divorced father has borne the responsibility of raising the child). 
*Michael E. Peeples, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.6. I G.L. c. 208, § 34 (1983). 
2 Jd. For a definition of "estate" see Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 
1307 (1977) (a party's estate includes all property to which he or she holds title, however 
acquired). But see Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364,474 N.E.2d 1137, 1145-
46 (1985) (expectancy under a will generally not property subject to division under section 
34). For a discussion of Davidson, see section 4.2 of this Survey. 
3 G.L. c. 208, § 34 (1983). 
4 /d. 
5 Putnam v. Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 14, 358 N.E.2d 837, 840 (1977). 
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"the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective 
estates," and each party's contribution to the family unit as a home-
maker. 6 One commentator has noted that these factors relate to equitably 
dividing property rather than to awarding alimony.7 
Massachusetts courts interpreting section 34 have ruled that it confers 
upon courts broad discretion when awarding alimony and making an 
equitable division of property upon divorce. 8 For example, in the 1977 
case of Rice v. Rice,9 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
that section 34 empowers courts to assign to one party all or part of the 
nonmarital property of the other "whenever and however acquired. "10 
Furthermore, Massachusetts courts have held that the weight to be ac-
corded to each of the section 34 factors in a particular case is within the 
judge's discretion. 11 In Rice, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that 
courts need broad discretion to address the "myriad" fact situations 
surrounding divorces and to resolve each case fairly. 12 Because section 
34 provides such latitude, Massachusetts courts also have held that a 
judge's findings must clearly indicate that he or she considered all of the 
statutory factors, both mandatory and discretionary, in making an ali-
mony award or property assignment. 13 In Rice, the Supreme Judicial 
Court stated that in future cases it wished to have findings showing that 
the judge weighed all of the statutory factors in making his or her deci-
sion. 14 Although section 34 distinguishes between factors a court shall 
consider and factors it may consider, the courts have concluded that the 
factors listed in section 34 define the scope of judicial discretion, and 
6 G.L. c. 208 § 34 (1983). 
7 Inker & Glower, Towards a New Justice in Marital Dissolution: The Massachusetts 
Statutory Scheme and Due Process Analysis, 16 SuFFOLK U.L. REV. 907, 912 (1982). 
8 See Rice, 372 Mass. at 400-01, 361 N .E.2d at 1307 (court may order transfer of separate 
property acquired before marriage and as gifts during marriage); Bianco v. Bianco, 371 
Mass. 420, 423, 358 N.E.2d 243, 245 (1976) (court may order wife to convey her interest 
in marital domicile to husband). The Rice court noted that courts require broad discretion 
to deal with the various fact situations surrounding divorces. Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 
N.E.2d at 1307. 
9 372 Mass. 398, 361 N.E.2d 1305 (1977). 
10 Id. at 399-400, 361 N.E.2d at 1307. But see Davidson, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 474 N.E.2d 
at 1143 (property interests subject to division are to be identified as of the time of divorce; 
"whenever and however acquired" does not refer to property acquired after divorce). For 
a discussion of Rice, see Inker, Perocchi & Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. SuRv. 
MAss. LAw§ 1.2, at 11. For a discussion of Davidson, see section 4.2 of this Survey. 
11 See Caldwell v. Caldwell, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 1032, 1032, 461 N.E.2d 834, 835 (1984); 
Langerman v. Langerman, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 869, 870, 401 N.E.2d 163, 164 (1980). 
12 Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1307. 
13 See Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1307; Bianco, 371 Mass. at 423, 358 N.E.2d 
at 245; Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 15, 358 N.E.2d at 841; Inker, Perocchi & Walsh, 
Domestic Relations, 1979 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 5.1, at 147. 
14 Rice, 372 Mass. at 402-03, 361 N.E.2d at 1308. 
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consideration of all the factors is mandatoryY Thus, under section 34, 
as interpreted by Massachusetts courts, a judge dividing property pur-
suant to a divorce has discretion to weigh the section 34 factors subject 
only to the requirement that the judge's findings clearly indicate that he 
or she considered all of the factors. 16 
During the Survey year, in Grubert v. Grubert, 17 the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court ruled that the provision for property division in section 
34 was not intended to reduce traditional alimony awards, and that any 
financial settlement incident to divorce must reflect a consideration of 
the need for alimony by adequately addressing the parties' needs for 
support, measured by their respective financial circumstances. 18 The 
Grubert decision indicates that a judge's discretion to fashion a financial 
settlement may be curtailed by the requirement that he or she adequately 
address the parties' need for alimony in each case, 19 and that evidence 
that a judge considered all of the section 34 factors may not insulate his 
or her findings from reversal on appeal. 
In Grubert, a probate court judge granted the wife a divorce, divided 
the marital property in half, and awarded the wife $400 a week in ali-
mony.20 At the time of divorce the parties had been married for thirty-
two years.21 During most of the marriage the wife had not worked outside 
of the home, and at the time of trial she was unemployed. 22 The wife was 
59 years old, suffered from high blood pressure, a high cholesterol read-
ing, anxiety, depression, and arthritis.23 At the time of divorce, the hus-
band, who was 54 years old and also had health problems,24 was a sales 
representative employed by his own wholly owned corporation and had 
an income exceeding $100,000 a year. 25 The parties enjoyed a comfortable 
income station during the marriage's latter years. 26 
The probate court judge, finding that the parties had contributed 
equally to the marriage, divided the marital assets equally.27 The judge 
"See Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1307; Bianco, 371 Mass. at 423, 358 N.E.2d 
at 245. 
16 See Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1307-08; Bianco, 371 Mass. at 423, 358 
N.E.2d at 245. 
11 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 483 N.E.2d 100 (1985). 
18 Id. at 818-19, 483 N.E.2d at 105. 
19 See id. 
2o Id. at 811, 483 N.E.2d at 101. 
21 Id. at 812, 483 N.E.2d at 101. 
22 ld. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 ld. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 816, 483 N.E.2d at 103. 
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ordered the conveyance of the parties' home to the wife.28 Because the 
home was the principal marital asset, however, the judge ordered the 
wife to grant the husband a second mortgage on the home,29 and ordered 
the wife to assume all of the expenses of the home, including the first 
mortgage.30 The judge awarded the wife $400 per week in alimony to 
cover her expenses, and ordered the husband to pay half of the wife's 
unpaid attorney's fees. 31 The wife appealed, challenging the judge's find-
ings as to the husband's income and assets.32 
The Appeals Court ruled that equal division of property should not 
overshadow traditional principles of alimony,33 and that any financial 
award pursuant to divorce must include a consideration of the parties' 
need for alimony as part of its "focus. "34 The Grubert court conceded 
that section 34 empowers courts to deal broadly with the division of 
property.35 But the court concluded that section 34 was not designed to 
reduce traditional alimony awards, and that "an order for the division of 
property cannot be viewed apart from alimony."36 The court stated that 
the fundamental issue in awarding alimony is a spouse's need for support 
in relation to the financial circumstances of the parties37 and that such 
need for support should be measured by the standard of living enjoyed 
by the parties during marriage. 38 
The Grubert court found the apparent evenhandedness of the probate 
court's division of property illusory.39 First, the court noted that the wife 
was unemployed and that the marketability of her services was question-
able.40 Furthermore, the court found that the alimony award of $400 a 
week would not cover the wife's expenses, and that the wife would be 
forced to sell the home.41 Finally, the court noted that while the wife 
28 ld. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 816-17, 483 N.E.2d at 104. 
31 Id. at 816, 483 N.E.2d at 103-04. 
32 Id. at 813, 483 N.E.2d at 102. 
33 Id. at 818, 483 N.E.2d at 104-05. 
34 Id. at 819, 483 N.E.2d at 105 (citing Partridge v. Partridge, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 918, 
919, 436 N.E.2d 447, 449 (1982)). 
35 Id. at 818, 483 N.E.2d at 105 (citing Bianco, 371 Mass. at 422-23, 358 N.E.2d at 245). 
36 Id. at 818, 483 N.E.2d at 105. 
37 Id. at 819, 483 N.E.2d at 105 (quoting Partridge, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 919,436 N.E.2d 
at 448-49). 
38 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 819, 483 N.E.2d at 105. 
39 Id. at 817, 483 N.E.2d at 104. 
40 Id. at 818, 483 N.E.2d at 104. 
41 Id. The court also noted that it was questionable whether the wife could find smaller 
shelter costing less than her current mortgage and maintenance expenses. Id. at 818 n.14, 
483 N.E.2d at 104 n.l4. 
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faced a future of uncertainty,42 the husband could afford to contribute 
tnore money for her support. 43 Accordingly, the Appeals Court held that 
the equal division of property in Grubert did not adequately address the 
wife's need for support irt relation to the husband's ability to contribute 
to her support. 44 The Appeals Court reversed the judgment, and re-
manded for determination of a more suitable award.45 
The Appeais Court offered comments as a guide to the probate judge 
on remand. 46 The court suggested that the judge consider ordering a more 
generous payment to the wife for counsel fees. 47 The court termed the 
judge's finding that the wife was abie to work part time "unrealistic and 
inappropriate," thus indicating that the judge should not expect the wife 
in this case to contribute to her support by working.48 The court also 
noted that parties to a divorce have an obligation to provide financial 
information to each other and to the court.49 Because the husband in 
Grubert was evasive about his finances, the Appeals Court ruled that a 
judge could draw all reasonable inferences against him. 50 
Section 34 lists factors a court must consider and those it may consider 
when awarding alimony and dividing marital property,51 and Massachu-
setts courts have ruled that a judge must weigh all of these section 34 
factors. 52 In ruling that a judge dividing property incident to a divorce 
must consider the parties' need for alimony, Grubert reaffirms the prin-
ciple that a court must weigh all of the section 34 factors. To this extent, 
the Grubert decision is consistent with section 34 and Massachusetts 
courts' application of the statute. 53 
Nevertheless, Grubert's emphasis on alimony considerations seems to 
change the interpretation Massachusetts courts have given to section 34. 
Section 34 does not provide a means of weighing the various factors that 
it lists, and, prior to Grubert, Massachusetts courts had ruled that ajudge 
has broad discretion to weigh the factors, subject to the requirement that 
42 /d. at 818, 483 N.E.2d at 104. 
43 /d. at 820, 483 N.E.2d at 106. 
44 /d. at 819, 822, 483 N.E.2d at 105, 106. 
45 /d. at 819, 483 N.E.2d at 105. 
46Jd. 
47 /d. at 820, 483 N.E.2d at 105. 
48 /d., 483 N.E.2d at 106. 
49 /d. at 822, 483 N.E.2d at 107. 
50 /d., 483 N.E.2d at 106-07. 
51 G.L. c. 208 § 34 (1983). 
52 Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1307; Bianco, 371 Mass. at 423, 358 N.E.2d at 
245; Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 15, 358 N.E.2d at 841. 
53 G.L. c. 208 § 34 (1983); see Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1307; Bianco, 371 
Mass. at 423, 358 N.E.2d at 245; Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 15, 358 N.E.2d at 841; 
Ioker, Perocchi & Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 1.2, at 12. 
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the judge's findings reflect a consideration of all the factors. 54 The courts 
had held that a judgment was subject to reversal only if the judge abused 
his or her discretion, that is, if the judge's findings were plainly wrong 
and excessive.55 In Grubert, however, the Massachusetts Court of Ap-
peals reversed a probate judge's order dividing property even though the 
record as cited by the Appeals Court indicated that the judge had con-
sidered all of the section 34 criteria,56 and even though Massachusetts 
courts had previously ruled that a judge has broad discretion to weigh 
the statutory criteria. The Grubert court's decision was not based on a 
finding of abuse of discretion or of clear error. Rather, the Grubert court 
held that the probate court's equal division of property overshadowed 
consideration of the need for alimony, which should be the focus of any 
such division of property. 57 By ruling that courts must adequately address 
a spouse's need for alimony, the Grubert court apparently has circum-
scribed the judge's discretion to divide property pursuant to a divorce. 
Under Grubert, an order dividing property may now be subject to reversal 
even if the record indicates that the judge considered the alimony factors 
listed in section 34, because even an equal division of property must 
include as part of its focus a consideration of the parties' need for support, 
as measured by their financial circumstances. 58 
54 See Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1308; Bianco, 371 Mass. at 423, 358 N.E.2d 
at 245. 
55 See Rice, 372 Mass. at 402, 361 N.E.2d at 1308; Meghreblian v. Meghreblian, 13 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1021, 1023, 433 N.E.2d 497, 499 (1982). 
56 Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 8ll-15, 483 N.E.2d at 100-03. 
57 Id. at 818-19, 483 N.E.2d at 105. 
58 ld. 
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